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I. INTRODUCTION
News leaks from government sources began appearing in the press
even before the nation’s capital relocated to the District of Columbia in
1800, and they have remained a staple of American political communication
ever since.1 Leaks have boosted the efforts of some public officials,
enraged others, and triggered occasional investigations for more than
two hundred years. Only rarely, however, did disputes over the identity
of government sources end up in court, leaving journalists’ confidentiality
law to coalesce from cases with factual settings bearing little resemblance
to the typical political leak. Most notably, Branzburg v. Hayes,2 the
1. The term leak originally applied to inadvertent slips by sources but has since
acquired a broader, more active meaning. A leak is the calculated release of information
to reporters with the stipulation that the source remain unidentified. See HATCHET JOBS
AND HARDBALL: THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL SLANG 162-63
(Grant Barrett ed., 2004); 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 759 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C.
Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989). Leaks authorized by an agency’s officials are sometimes
known as plants. See STEPHEN HESS, THE GOVERNMENT/PRESS CONNECTION 75 (1984).
Though now dated, the most thorough review of different conceptions of leaks is
Muhammad A. Dahlan, Anonymous Disclosure of Government Information as a Form of
Political Communication 19-38 (1967) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Illinois) (on file with Author). See also infra Part IV (discussing the various types of
leaks). For this Article, leak denotes any information released to the press by a
government source with an expectation of anonymity, ranging from high-ranking elected
or appointed officials to staff members or employees. Leaks can also spring from
nongovernmental institutions, but as used here the term carries the narrower meaning of
a source in government. For a discussion of whistleblowing in business that notes
important parallels with leaks from government, see, for example, Terry Morehead
Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Employee Disclosures to the Media: When Is a
“Source” a “Sourcerer”?, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 357 (1993).
2. 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (rejecting a First Amendment privilege for reporters to
refuse to testify before grand juries when witnessing possible crimes). For further
discussion of this case, see infra Part III.B.
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Supreme Court’s only direct engagement with journalists’ confidentiality,3
never mentioned the word leak and only obliquely addressed the place of
anonymous sources in political communication.4 Journalists’ confidentiality
law thus developed with scant consideration for the role of leaks in
governance.5
A spate of recent stories highlights the importance of leaks and
reminds journalists of the tenuous legal status of any confidentiality
promises they make.6 In 2005, a special counsel hauled several journalists
before a grand jury, and jailed one for twelve weeks in pursuit of sources
who had leaked the name of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
operative.7 Later that year the Washington Post published a story, based
on leaks, about secret overseas U.S. prisons for terrorists,8 and the New
York Times revealed that the National Security Agency had been
monitoring telecommunications without warrants since the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001.9 Both of these stories also triggered leak

3. Since Branzburg, “the Court has never again accepted for review a case
directly raising issues surrounding the constitutional privilege,” and has provided only
indirect guidance in other types of cases. C. THOMAS DIENES, LEE LEVINE, & ROBERT C.
LIND, NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW 930 (3d ed. 2005). “Perhaps because these
infrequent and decidedly nondefinitive clues concerning the contours of the privilege are
all that the Court has offered since Branzburg, they continue to be consulted and
interpreted with something approaching talmudic passion.” Id.
4. The Court cites, but does not discuss, its seminal case dealing with anonymous
communication by a pamphleteer. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 680 (citing Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960)).
5. See Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Branzburg Revisited: Confidential Sources
and First Amendment Values, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 13, 14, 32-33 (1988).
6. Besides the major controversies surrounding leaks discussed in this paragraph,
another set of 2005 cases held the attention of journalists. Several reporters were held in
contempt for refusing to identify government sources sought by Dr. Wen Ho Lee for his
suit claiming that leaks accusing him of espionage had violated his rights under federal
privacy law. See Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Lee v. Dep’t of
Justice, 401 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2005); infra notes 223-34 and accompanying text.
7. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 966-67 (D.C. Cir.
2005); see also David Johnston & Richard W. Stevenson, Cheney Aide Charged with
Lying in Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, at A1; David Johnston & Richard W.
Stevenson, Times Reporter Gives Testimony in C.I.A. Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2005, at A1; infra Part III.D.
8. Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons; Debate Is Growing
Within Agency About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set up After 9/11,
WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at A1.
9. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
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investigations.10 Even history fueled the debate over leaks in 2005.
Deep Throat, the anonymous source who had kept the Washington
Post’s Watergate reporting on track, stepped forward to end thirty years
of speculation about his identity.11
When leaks produce legal battles over the identities of unnamed sources,
an uncommon occurrence until recently,12 journalists’ confidentiality
law treats them as disputes over evidence and ignores both their origins
as political speech and their value to governance. Unlike the situations
presented in Branzburg, the recent CIA leak case stemmed from partisan
and bureaucratic maneuvering. The leak itself targeted a George W.
Bush administration critic, while the ensuing probe to ferret out the
unnamed sources was partly actuated by CIA and White House officials
jockeying to blame each other for intelligence failures.13 Although the
appellate court noted the political roots of the case and used the word
leak throughout its opinions, the legal rules it applied adhered closely to

10. See, e.g., David Johnston & Carl Hulse, C.I.A. Asks Criminal Inquiry Over
Secret-Prison Article, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at A18; Scott Shane, Criminal Inquiry
Opens into Leak in Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2005, at A1. The secretprisons story even triggered a leak investigation overseas. See Doreen Carvajal, Swiss
Investigate Leak to Paper on C.I.A. Prisons in Eastern Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2006, at A11.
11. See BOB WOODWARD, THE SECRET MAN: THE STORY OF WATERGATE’S DEEP
THROAT (2005); John D. O’Connor, “I’m the Guy They Called Deep Throat,” VANITY
FAIR, July 2005, at 86; see also infra notes 359-62 and accompanying text (discussing
the role of leaks in Watergate).
12. Accurate counts of subpoenas seeking the identity of government sources as a
subset of all subpoenas served on the press are elusive. The Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press most thoroughly tracks legal battles involving all aspects of
journalists’ confidentiality. See Shields and Subpoenas, http://www.rcfp.org/shields_and_
subpoenas.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2006). The Committee’s homepage, http://www.
rcfp.org/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2006), refers to “the unprecedented number of federal
subpoenas.” See also Douglas McCollam, Why the Plame Case Is So Scary: Attack at
the Source, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar./Apr. 2005, at 29 (2005) (listing several
confidentiality cases involving government sources). In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
the Nixon administration obtained dozens, maybe hundreds, of subpoenas to get
information from the press about counterculture activities, but these did not target
sources in government. See Margaret Sherwood, Note, The Newsman’s Privilege:
Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and Private Litigation, 58 CAL. L.
REV. 1198, 1202 (1970).
13. See Scott Shane, Ex-Diplomat’s Surprise Volley on Iraq Drove White House
Into Political Warfare Mode, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2005, § 1, at 20 (“Behind the scenes,
the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council were skirmishing
over who would take the blame for inaccurate intelligence.”). Several months later,
reports indicated that both President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney
had approved intelligence leaks about Iraq’s weapons program. See David Johnston &
David E. Sanger, Cheney’s Aide Says President Approved Leak, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
2006, at A1; see also Christopher Hitchens, The Insider, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2005, § 7,
at 8 (comparing Nixon era bureaucratic infighting that led to leaks with
intragovernmental disagreements over the Iraq War that prompted leaks).
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those established by the Supreme Court in 1972.14 Other examples
further illustrate the political essence of most leaks. For instance, the
judge supervising independent counsel Kenneth Starr’s investigation of
President Bill Clinton felt compelled to appoint a special master in 1998
to examine the flood of leaks from that probe.15 With leaks so thoroughly
steeped in politics, courtrooms hardly seem the most appropriate venue,
nor do the customary rules of evidence provide the best tools, to balance
the interests at stake.
Journalists’ standard argument for an evidentiary privilege—that
confidentiality assures a continuing flow of information to the public16—
understates the importance of leaks. The assertion that informants with
sensitive information will dry up unless journalists guarantee their
confidentiality applies to all reporter-source relations and ignores
considerations specific to leaks from government sources. Speech about
government occupies a special place in the American system of free
expression. The venerable notion of the press as the fourth estate, one of the
checks and balances in governance, partly epitomizes this conception.17
14. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(“[T]his litigation began with a political and news media controversy over a sixteenword sentence in the State of the Union Address of President George W. Bush on
January 28, 2003.”).
15. The White House and Starr pointed to one another as the source of the leaks.
James Bennet, Whispered Secrets Start a Loud Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1998, at
A15. News analysts observed that this was but the latest instance of a prosecutor seeking
tactical advantages by leaking information from supposedly secret grand jury
proceedings. See William Glaberson, Pssst, Says Prosecutor to Reporter; I’m All Ears,
Is the Reply, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1998, at A22. After several months, Judge Norma
Holloway Johnson appointed a special master to investigate whether leaks from the
independent counsel’s office violated rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure governing grand jury secrecy. See Neil A. Lewis, Judge Cites Possible
Improper Leaks by Starr Office, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1998, at A9. The leaks prompted
Judge Holloway to order the Justice Department to launch a criminal investigation of
Starr’s office, but an appeals court reversed. See Neil A. Lewis, A Leak from Starr’s
Office Was Not Illegal, Court Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1999, at A18. Charles G.
Bakaly III, former spokesman for the office of independent counsel, was prosecuted but
acquitted for lying about leaks. John M. Broder, Starr’s Ex-Spokesman Charged with
Contempt in Case on Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2000, at A10; David Stout, Aide to Starr
Is Acquitted of Contempt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2000, at A12.
16. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679-80 (1972) (summarizing
petitioners’ argument as follows: compelling the disclosure of sources will deter others
from providing information “all to the detriment of the free flow of information
protected by the First Amendment”).
17. See generally TIMOTHY W. GLEASON, THE WATCHDOG CONCEPT (1990)
(tracing the origins of the watchdog concept in First Amendment theory to nineteenthcentury cases); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977
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The watchdog role, however, overemphasizes the adversarial nature of
press-government relations by discounting the many ways that officials use
the media to govern.18 Leaks warrant a distinct status in confidentiality
law because they serve governance both ways. In a system with divided
but shared powers, leaks supplement or complement official communications
as well as challenge them.
The flow-of-information-to-the-public argument also falls short in
court because it conflates two claims—reporters’ right to gather news
and the public’s right to receive it—neither of which rests on solid
constitutional footing.19 In contrast, treating leaks as speech by and
about government emphasizes their political and institutional role,
shifting the basis for claiming an evidentiary privilege into a new realm.
It also distinguishes them from other situations in which journalists
invoke an evidentiary privilege. Leaks would thus warrant greater
protection whether analyzed using classic First Amendment doctrine,
which treats political speech as the core value at stake,20 or more recent
approaches focusing on the social and institutional contexts of
communication.21 As courts grapple with leak cases, and as legislatures,
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977) (arguing that the watchdog or checking role of the
press underpins a wide range of First Amendment decisions); Potter Stewart, “Or of the
Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975) (arguing that the First Amendment’s language
mentioning the press in addition to speech suggests that the media deserve special
institutional protection). The watchdog role fits squarely in the libertarian conception of
the press. See generally Fred S. Siebert, The Libertarian Theory of the Press, in FOUR
THEORIES OF THE PRESS 39 (Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson, & Wilbur Schramm eds.,
1956) (providing the historical, cultural, and philosophical context for the idea that a free
press exists in tension with government).
18. See generally TIMOTHY E. COOK, GOVERNING WITH THE NEWS: THE NEWS
MEDIA AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION (1998) (providing a historically sensitive look, by a
political scientist, at the central role occupied by the press in governance); RICHARD B.
KIELBOWICZ, NEWS IN THE MAIL: THE PRESS, POST OFFICE, AND PUBLIC INFORMATION,
1700-1860S (1989) (noting how early Congresses facilitated communication between
officials and the electorate by conferring postal privileges on the press). In contrast to
the largely negative role for government in the libertarian conception of the press, the
social responsibility theory recognizes that government has an affirmative duty to
enhance communication. See generally 1 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND
MASS COMMUNICATIONS: A REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
(1947) (discussing government’s various roles in improving public communication
consistent with First Amendment principles); Theodore Peterson, The Social Responsibility
Theory of the Press, in FOUR THEORIES, supra note 17, at 73 (sketching the historical,
technological, and philosophical bases for an affirmative government role in
communication).
19. On the right to gather and receive information, see infra notes 400-03 and
accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 389-94 and accompanying text.
21. The work of Frederick Schauer and Robert C. Post are especially noteworthy
in rethinking First Amendment analysis. Schauer recommends applying the First
Amendment in a fashion that recognizes the “contingent institutional elements of our
collective life” instead of categorizing speech “on the basis of the content of the
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including Congress,22 consider shield laws, they should carefully weigh
the political and institutional contributions of anonymous communications
from government sources. Any judicial or legislative rules governing
leaks should start with a strong presumption in favor of protecting a
leaker’s identity. They should then incorporate elements in the legal analysis
beyond the criteria now customarily used in deciding confidentiality
cases.23
When the Supreme Court first grappled with prior restraints and the
rights of reporters to attend criminal trials, it looked to history and the
societal functions of the media in establishing presumptions that favored
the press.24 This Article follows a similar path. Part II sketches the role
communication.” Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89
MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1256, 1259 (2005); see also Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of
the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 1765 (2004); Frederick Schauer, Comment, Principles, Institutions, and the First
Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998). Post focuses less on the institutions of
communication, but agrees with Schauer that First Amendment applications should be
more sensitive to the “particular social practices” connected with communication and the
“nature and constitutional significance of such practices.” Robert C. Post, Recuperating
First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1250 (1995).
22. The controversy over contempt citations for journalists in the CIA leak case
led to the latest congressional consideration of a federal shield law. See Free Flow of
Information Act of 2005, S. 1419, 109th Cong. (2005); Free Flow of Information Act of
2005, H.R. 3323, 109th Cong. (2005); Free Speech Protection Act of 2005, S. 369, 109th
Cong. (2005). The Senate held hearings on these bills in 2005. See Reporters’ Privilege
Legislation: Issues and Implications: Hearings Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th
Cong. (2005), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1579; Reporters’
Privilege Legislation: An Additional Investigation of Issues and Implications: Hearings
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://judiciary.
senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1637. For similar bills introduced in the wake of Branzburg,
see infra Part III.C.1.
23. For a discussion of the traditional elements considered in journalists’
confidentiality cases, see infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
24. In the first prior restraint case to come before it, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 713 (1931), the Supreme Court relied heavily on a review of historical experience to
conclude that such restrictions should be presumed unconstitutional. “The question is
whether a statute authorizing such proceedings in restraint of publication is consistent
with the conception of the liberty of the press as historically conceived and guaranteed.”
Id. at 713. Similarly, in the Supreme Court’s first direct engagement with the
constitutional right of the press and public to attend criminal trials, Chief Justice Warren
Burger’s opinion relied heavily on historical experience and the functional role of the
press in reporting on the legal system. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555, 564-73 (1980). “From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons
as valid today as in centuries past, we are bound to conclude that a presumption of
openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice.” Id. at
573. Several years later, the Court expressly incorporated historical and functional tests
into the process a judge must follow before closing pre- or post-trial proceedings or
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of leaks in governance between the adoption of the Constitution and
World War II to underscore the integral role leaks have played in the
nation’s political communication. Part III shows that the general law of
journalists’ confidentiality before and after Branzburg developed with
little regard for the distinct institutional contributions of leaks. Part IV
provides two perspectives on leaks that underscore their centrality in
modern governance. When considered together, these perspectives suggest
guidelines for courts as they weigh the value of different types of leaks.
Finally, Part V recommends how the legal principles currently regulating
journalists’ confidentiality can be adjusted slightly to accommodate the
contributions of political leaks to governance.
II. A HISTORICAL SNAPSHOT OF LEAKS AND THEIR
ROLE IN GOVERNANCE
Leaks to the press have always figured in the formal and informal
processes of government, though their frequency and character have
changed with developments in journalism and shifts in institutional
power. The earliest leaks and leak investigations stemmed from partisan
maneuvering in Congress, the principal locus of federal decisionmaking
for most of the nineteenth century. With the emergence of the modern
administrative state in the late 1800s, leaks began springing from many
government agencies as part of a burgeoning culture of news management.
A. Leaks in the Era of Congressional Dominance and a Partisan Press
Leaks that involved Congress in the nineteenth century served at least
four purposes. They armed minority factions with the power of publicity,
gave lawmakers leverage in battles with the White House, exposed
congressional corruption, and prompted investigations of executive
departments.25 To accomplish their goals, congressional leakers typically
sealing pre- or post-trial documents. Press-Enter. Co. v. Riverside Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1
(1986). In the first phase of the process, a judge determines whether a proceeding or
document is presumptively open by considering whether it has historically been open to
the press and public, or whether access functions positively in the judicial system and
society. Id. at 10-12. Although this Article tackles a different topic, it likewise provides
background for a historical test in Part II and a functional evaluation of leaks in Part IV.
25. The most thorough studies of congressional leaks and the press are Leigh F.
Gregg, The First Amendment in the Nineteenth Century: Journalists’ Privilege and
Congressional Investigations (1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Wisconsin) (on file with University of Wisconsin Library); and Thomas H. Kaminski,
Congress, Correspondents, and Confidentiality in the Nineteenth Century (1976)
(unpublished M.S. thesis, San Diego State University) (on file with Claremont Colleges
Libraries) [hereinafter Correspondents and Confidentiality]. See also Thomas H. Kaminski,
Congress, Correspondents and Confidentiality in the 19th Century: A Preliminary Study, 4
JOURNALISM HIST. 83 (1977) (summarizing findings from his thesis).
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planted their stories with like-minded partisan newspapers.26 Investigations
of the leaks themselves or the problems they exposed frequently
ensnared reporters, some of whom cooperated while others protected
their sources. When congressional investigations turned into legal battles
over journalists’ confidentiality, reporters relied mainly on claims of
personal honor that they had given their word, rather than assertions of
abstract press rights.
The first significant leak occurred as part of the fierce partisan
struggles between Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans.27 A 1795
leak by Republican Senators embarrassed President George Washington,
the congressional majority, and the Chief Justice—all Federalists. The
Senators violated their chamber’s order enjoining members to secrecy
and passed along to a journalistic ally information about the first treaty
signed after the adoption of the Constitution.28 Negotiated by Chief

26. Early Presidents also wrote anonymously for friendly papers or encouraged
others in their administrations to do so. See JAMES E. POLLARD, THE PRESIDENTS AND
THE PRESS 40, 129, 156-57, 353 (1947) (discussing anonymous contributions to the press
by Vice President John Adams and Presidents John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson,
and Abraham Lincoln). On partisan journalism and the close relations between the press
and government through the Civil War, see generally WILLIAM E. AMES, A HISTORY OF
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER (1972); CULVER H. SMITH, THE PRESS, POLITICS, AND
PATRONAGE: THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT’S USE OF NEWSPAPERS, 1789-1875 (1977).
27. Of course, leaks to the press occurred before the organization of the U.S.
government. See, e.g., Larry L. Burriss, America’s First Newspaper Leak: Tom Paine
and the Disclosure of Secret French Aid to the United States (1983) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Ohio University) (on file with Ohio University Library). More generally,
the practice of attacking authorities through anonymous and pseudonymous articles and
pamphlets was well established before the Revolutionary War, though such actions may
not qualify as leaks. Benjamin Franklin recalled a 1722 incident involving his older
brother’s New England Courant: “One of the Pieces in our News-Paper, on some
political Point which I have now forgotten, gave Offence to the [colonial] Assembly. He
was taken up, censur’d and imprison’d for a Month by the Speaker’s Warrant, I suppose
because he would not discover his Author.” THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN 69 (Leonard W. Labaree et al. eds., Yale Univ. Press 1964) (1790); see also
JEFFREY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM: THE IDEOLOGY OF EARLY AMERICAN
JOURNALISM 100-04 (1988) (discussing the circumstances that led to James Franklin’s
imprisonment for legislative contempt). As part of the 1735 seditious libel prosecution
of John Peter Zenger, the royal governor offered a reward to anyone who identified the
author(s) of the offending articles. See JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE
CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER 18 (Stanley N. Katz ed., Harvard Univ. Press,
2d ed. 1972) (1736).
28. The Senate adopted an order “[t]hat the Senators be under an injunction of
secrecy on the communications this day received from the President of the United States,
until the further order of the Senate.” 1 S. EXEC. J. 178 (4th Cong., Spec. Sess. (1795));
see also JAMES TAGG, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN BACHE AND THE PHILADELPHIA AURORA 244-
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Justice John Jay, the treaty offered concessions to the British that
discomfited even Federalists.29 When the staunchly Republican Aurora
published the treaty, so many people thronged the newspaper’s office to
get a copy that the scene “was more like a fair than anything else,” the
editor’s wife remarked.30
Five years later, the same newspaper became the first target of a leak
investigation. Its new editor, William Duane, who had been prosecuted
under state and federal sedition laws for earlier criticisms of the
Federalists,31 published a story about a politically sensitive bill based on
information leaked from a secret Senate session.32 The Federalist bill,
introduced in anticipation of the 1800 election, proposed to revise the
procedure for deciding the outcome of close presidential races.33
Recognizing the incendiary nature of the proposal,34 outraged
Jeffersonian Senators ignored the confidentiality rule and passed the
news to Duane.35
The ensuing leak inquiry, called “the first congressional investigation
of the press, the first forcible detention of a journalist by Congress, and
the first citation [of a journalist] for contempt of Congress,” then became
as much the issue as the leak itself.36 One Republican Senator defended
anonymous communications about public affairs. “Men who engage in
public life, or are members of legislative bodies, must expect to be
exposed to anonymous, and sometimes avowed, attacks on their
47 (1991); Everette E. Dennis, Stolen Peace Treaties and the Press: Two Case Studies, 2
JOURNALISM HIST. 6 (1975).
29. See TAGG, supra note 28, at 239-44.
30. Quoted in Bernard Fay, Benjamin Franklin Bache, A Democratic Leader of the
Eighteenth Century, 40 PROC. AM. ANTIQUARIAN SOC’Y (n.s.) 277, 293 (1931); see also
Dennis, supra note 28, at 7-8.
31. A jury acquitted Duane for circulating a petition against the Alien and Sedition
Acts, and Federalists prosecuted him under federal sedition law for alleging that the
British exerted undue influence on the State Department. Federalists abandoned the
case, however, when Duane claimed to have a letter from President John Adams leveling
the same charge. See RICHARD N. ROSENFELD, AMERICAN AURORA: A DEMOCRATICREPUBLICAN RETURNS 592-95, 771 (1997); JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS:
THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 279-88 (1956).
32. See S. MISC. DOC. NO. 53-278, at 7-8 (2d Sess. 1894) [hereinafter PRECEDENTS
OF THE SENATE & HOUSE]; ROSENFELD, supra note 31, at 746-70.
33. See SMITH, supra note 31, at 288-89.
34. The proposal prompted even a Federalist to proclaim that “the Senate ought to
be hanged, I mean the Federal part of the Senate.” JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM:
THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS 200 (1952).
35. DONALD A. RITCHIE, PRESS GALLERY: CONGRESS AND THE WASHINGTON
CORRESPONDENTS 10 (1991).
36. Id. at 10. But see ERNEST J. EBERLING, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: A
STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO INVESTIGATE
AND PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT 37-41 (Octagon Books 1973) (1928) (noting an earlier
congressional citation for contempt, but one not involving a journalist); see also SMITH,
supra note 31, at 288-306 (providing the best discussion of this incident).
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principles and opinions.”37 Ironically, Vice President Jefferson, as the
presiding officer, represented the Senate in investigating his journalistic
ally Duane to determine the source of the leak.38 Brought before the
Senate, Duane requested a delay to consult with counsel, but leading
Republican attorneys refused to defend him in a chamber that set its own
rules.39 Duane never returned to the Senate and lawmakers held him in
contempt but made no effort to enforce their order.40 Once Congress
adjourned, Duane reappeared in public as a “persecuted Patriot, &
Martyr to the Liberty of the Press.”41
Duane was but the first of at least 222 correspondents, news writers,
and editors who were asked by congressional committees during the
nineteenth century to identify sources or disclose other information.42
Most of the major leak investigations before the Civil War involved the
Senate because of its general penchant for secrecy, especially in
reviewing treaties.43 But efforts to conduct Senate business in closed
executive sessions were “little more than a charade since the press so
easily uncovered and reported their substance, quoted their speeches,
and reprinted tallies of votes cast,” according to a Senate historian.44 For
instance, the Democratic Washington-based Daily Times reported that
Whig officials were conspiring, perhaps treasonously, with the British
minister in an 1846 deal to resolve a boundary dispute with Canada.45
During the Senate inquiry, the paper identified its sources. Under oath,
however, these individuals denied that they had passed information to
the Daily Times.46 The investigating committee found the paper’s
37. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 78 (1800) (remarks of Sen. Charles Pinckney of South
Carolina).
38. See MILLER, supra note 34, at 201.
39. Id. at 200-01; ROSENFELD, supra note 31, at 761.
40. See PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & HOUSE, supra note 32, at 14-16; RITCHIE,
supra note 35, at 11. The Senate did urge his prosecution for sedition. His indictment
under federal sedition law was dismissed after the election of Thomas Jefferson as
President. MILLER, supra note 34, at 202.
41. Letter from William Bingham to Rufus King (Aug. 6, 1800) in 3 THE LIFE AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING 284 (Charles R. King ed., New York, G. P. Putnam’s
Sons, 1896).
42. For a thorough accounting of journalists called before Congress to testify about
their sources or secret information they published, see Gregg, supra note 25, at 526.
43. RITCHIE, supra note 35, at 163.
44. Id.
45. Much of the pertinent material in connection with this episode is reprinted in
PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & HOUSE, supra note 32, at 45-76.
46. Id. at 65-74.
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charges false, and the Senate expelled the Daily Times from the chamber’s
press galleries.47
The Senate’s secret review of treaties also led to three incidents
between 1844 and 1848 in which newspapers published whole documents,
not just information about them.48 Most significantly, the New York
Herald’s publication of the still secret 1848 treaty that ended the war
with Mexico prompted a rare confinement of a journalist, an even rarer
court decision, and one of the few wide-ranging nineteenth-century
debates about leaks.49 The paper’s correspondent, John Nugent, refused
to name his source, though he denied that it was anyone connected with
the Senate.50 The Senate cited Nugent for contempt, and confined him
in a committee room for several days, but he still managed to file articles
for the Herald under the dateline “Custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms of
the Senate.”51 Nugent challenged the Senate’s confinement by filing a
writ of habeas corpus. Judge William Cranch, however, ruled solidly for
the Senate.52 He noted the Senate’s authority to “punish all contempts of
its authority” and the merits of its standing rules protecting the secrecy
of communications from the President, especially for treaty deliberations.53
To save face, the Senate finally released Nugent because of the prisoner’s
supposed poor health.54
In one of its last comments on the Nugent matter, the Herald offered a
“Statistical Table of the Leaks of the United States Senate” that
underscored the hypocrisy of the Senate’s action and indicated how
leaks had become a common tool of political communication.55 The
table’s first column listed newspapers in five leading cities, the second
47. See id. at 76.
48. Documents published in connection with an 1844 treaty to annex Texas led the
Senate to censure one of its own members for the disclosure. RITCHIE, supra note 35, at
28. In 1846, the Senate investigated two correspondents who obtained the treaty settling
the Oregon boundary dispute. Id.
49. See F. B. MARBUT, NEWS FROM THE CAPITAL: THE STORY OF WASHINGTON
REPORTING 85-93 (1971).
50. 7 S. EXEC. J. 354-404 (30th Cong., 1st Sess. 1848) (reporting the interrogation
of Nugent about the source of the leak).
51. See, e.g., Galviensis and the Senate, N.Y. HERALD, Apr. 13, 1848, at 3
(Galviensis was Nugent’s pen name).
52. Ex parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471, 483 (C.C.D.C. 1848) (No. 10,375).
53. Id. The Supreme Court narrowed congressional contempt power in Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881). For a state court ruling similar to Nugent, see Ex
parte D.O. McCarthy, 29 Cal. 395 (1866). A San Francisco newspaper had reported that
members of the state senate received thousands of dollars to secure their votes on a bill;
the editor refused to identify his sources and was held in contempt of the legislature.
McCarthy, 29 Cal. at 397-99; Correspondents and Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 26972. The editor unsuccessfully challenged his detention in the state supreme court.
McCarthy, 29 Cal. at 407.
54. RITCHIE, supra note 35, at 29.
55. Presidential, Senatorial and Diplomatic Secrecy, N.Y. HERALD, May 3, 1848, at 2.
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named the correspondent for each, and the third identified senators who
favored each reporter with confidential information.56 “The whig Senators
were . . . the most comprehensive leakers,” the Herald noted wryly, “but
some of the democratic Senators were the most accurate leakers during
these mysterious debates.”57
The focus of major leaks and the relationship of reporters to the stories
both shifted perceptively in the second half of the nineteenth century.
The Senate’s secret review of treaties continued to pique reportorial
curiosity,58 but leaks increasingly dealt with allegations of corruption
in Congress and federal agencies. At the same time, Washington
correspondents became more than conduits for stories of partisan
maneuvering. Some figured centrally in the stories themselves, which
complicated congressional investigations.59
An 1857 story based partly on leaked information prompted the
resignations of three members of Congress and the passage of a law that
compelled testimony in congressional hearings. In January, the New
York Times printed an article from its Washington correspondent, James
W. Simonton, charging that lobbyists induced corrupt members of
Congress to enact the Minnesota Land Bill that granted land to railroads.60
An accompanying editorial referred to the “new and magnificent landstealing scheme,” alleging that some congressmen received $1000 for
their vote.61 The ensuing investigation followed two tracks. One dealt
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Three examples convey the flavor of Senate leak investigations in connection
with treaties. “A treaty negotiated early in 1854 by southern railroad promoter James
Gadsden, who represented President Pierce, and Mexican President Santa Ana was
leaked to the press prior to declassification of the document.” Correspondents and
Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 237. In this case, however, the Senate investigated just
its members, not the press. Id. at 237-38. In 1871, the Senate investigated how reporters
obtained copies of the Treaty of Washington. See PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & HOUSE,
supra note 32, at 311-504; see also RITCHIE, supra note 35, at 90-91. In 1881 the Senate
sought to determine how the press obtained proposed treaties with China, and then
investigated how news of the secret leak investigation itself was leaked. See
Correspondents and Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 312-15.
59. On general changes in relations between reporters and their Washington
sources from the Civil War to the early 1900s, see MARBUT, supra note 49, at 134-60;
MARK WAHLGREN SUMMERS, THE PRESS GANG: NEWSPAPERS AND POLITICS, 1865-1878,
1-8 (1994).
60. H.R. REP. NO. 34-243, at 160 (3d Sess. 1857); The Pacific Railroad—Minnesota Land
Grant—A Monster Speculation—Congressional Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1857, at 1.
61. Editorial, Piracies of the Washington Lobby—The Land Robberies, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 1857, at 4.
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with the substance of the charges, which forced three resignations, while
the other focused on the leak.62
During the debate to establish a select investigating committee, one
lawmaker denounced newspaper correspondents as “those demented
fragments of humanity that hang around this Hall merely for the purpose
of gathering up every whisper and every word that may fall from the lips
of a member, even in private conversation, and trumpeting it throughout
the land.”63 New York Times editor and publisher Henry J. Raymond
and the paper’s Washington correspondent James W. Simonton testified
before the select committee about a week after the offending articles
appeared.64 Both disavowed having direct knowledge of actual bribes,
but they insisted they had heard about them from reliable sources.65
Simonton said that members of Congress routinely asked if they could
trust him to keep their confidences. “In my profession, such questions
are put to me almost every day . . . and I always, unless I have some special
reasons for supposing that the particular individual has an improper
proposal to make, accept their confidence, and give my unqualified
promise not to reveal their names.”66 He testified that two lawmakers
had directly asked him to broker bribes and others had intimated that
they wanted the reporter’s help to arrange payments for their votes.67
When Simonton refused to identify his sources, the House held him in
contempt for nineteen days.68 The House investigation also revealed that
Simonton had acted as a lobbyist in a minor capacity some years earlier;
lawmakers used this finding to expel him from the press galleries.69
One day after the House voted to hold Simonton in contempt, it passed
a bill to punish recalcitrant witnesses and the Senate quickly concurred.70
The 1857 legislative contempt statute set a maximum fine of $1000 and
a one year jail sentence for anyone who “refuse[s] to answer any
question pertinent to the matter of inquiry in consideration . . . .”71
Simonton, in fact, had cited the absence of such a clear-cut law as one
62. H.R. REP. NO. 34-243 (3d Sess. 1857); CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess.
274-77 (1857); PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & HOUSE, supra note 32, at 85-190.
63. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 276 (1857) (quoting remarks of Rep.
Brenton); PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & HOUSE, supra note 32, at 92.
64. H.R. REP. NO. 34-243, at 154-79 (3d Sess. 1857).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 162.
67. Id. at 166-67.
68. See PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & HOUSE, supra note 32, at 117-27;
Correspondents and Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 243-44.
69. Correspondents and Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 243-44.
70. See PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & HOUSE, supra note 32, at 129-90 (tracing
the congressional deliberations on the law).
71. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 29, 11 Stat. 155 (1857) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 192
(2000)).
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basis for his refusal to answer questions. “You have not on your statutebooks any law forbidding that confidence—none whatever,” he told the
House.72 “Make such a law, and I will observe it. Make such a law, and
when Mr. A or Mr. B comes to me, and wishes to make a confidential
communication, I will say to him: ‘Yes, I will receive it, subject always
to the provisions of this law.’”73 The 1857 statute, however, did little
more than codify Congress’s inherent contempt power recognized by the
courts nine years earlier.74
Regardless of the statute, stories about official corruption based on
anonymous sources proliferated after mid-century, especially during the
scandal-ridden Gilded Age.75 Accordingly, leak investigations peaked in
the 1870s.76 Between 1870 and 1876, confrontations between Congress
and reporters over unnamed sources occurred as part of investigations
into mismanagement at the Freedman’s Bureau,77 bribes allegedly
offered to congressmen by lobbyists for Cuban rebels,78 charges of
corruption against the secretary of the Navy and his department,79
distributions of Union Pacific Railroad stock to lawmakers in the
infamous Credit Mobilier scandal,80 rumors that lobbyists bribed
congressmen and reporters to support subsidies for the Pacific Mail
72. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong. 3d Sess. 411 (1857).
73. Id.
74. See Ex parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471 (C.C.D.C. 1848) (No. 10,375); EBERLING,
supra note 36, at 341-91 (discussing early judicial review of congressional power to
compel testimony and punish for contempt); supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text
(discussing Nugent).
75. See generally SUMMERS, supra note 59 (discussing the role of the press in
Gilded Age politics). Of course, not all mid-century leaks involved corruption; some
investigations were instituted more as political retribution. In 1860, for instance, a
Republican congressman launched a leak investigation—basically a fishing expedition
that involved several journalists—to determine whether the Democratic administration of
James Buchanan was using bribes to secure the passage of laws in Congress. See H.R.
REP. NO. 36-648 (1st Sess. 1860); see also Correspondents and Confidentiality, supra
note 25, at 244-48. An 1862 House Judiciary Committee investigation of telegraphic
censorship in Washington expanded its scope to determine how the New York Herald
obtained an early version of President Abraham Lincoln’s State of the Union address; the
investigation, which suggested that Lincoln’s wife was the source, gave radical
Republicans an opportunity to embarrass the President. See id. at 250-67.
76. Gregg, supra note 25, at 584 (“The 1870s produced the most recorded
investigations and the most testimony from journalists.”).
77. See H.R. REP. NO. 41-121 (2d Sess. 1870).
78. See H.R. REP. NO. 41-104 (2d Sess. 1870); 2 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES § 1635, at 1108-09 (1907).
79. See H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 42-201 (2d Sess. 1872).
80. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 42-77 (3d Sess. 1873).
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Steamship Line,81 election frauds in Alabama,82 malfeasance in the War
Department,83 and the misuse of money appropriated for Indian tribes by
the Interior Department.84 Although Congress conducted fewer leak
investigations in the 1880s and 1890s, lawmakers still sought information
from at least twenty-three journalists during these two decades.85
One late nineteenth-century investigation underscored the confounding
nature of leaks. They shed light on government operations but, by using
anonymous sources, denied readers an opportunity to evaluate the stories
and frustrated lawmakers’ inquiries into the merits of the charges. In
1894, correspondents for New York and Philadelphia newspapers had
reported that the “Sugar Trust” tried to secure favorable tariff legislation
by bribing Senators and contributing to Democratic Party campaigns.86
A Senate investigating committee referred the reporters for prosecution
when they refused to identify their sources.87 Some newspapers, notably
the New York Times, agreed that the reporters should identify their
sources to assure the public that the story was more than a stratagem to
embarrass Democrats.88 But the two reporters stood firm. A grand jury
indicted them, along with other contumacious witnesses, for violating
the 1857 contempt of Congress statute.89 The District of Columbia courts
overruled their demurrers, rejecting claims of a reporter’s privilege, and
ordered the defendants to plead.90 The reporters ultimately prevailed

81. See H.R. REP. NO. 43-268 (2d Sess. 1875).
82. See H.R. REP. NO. 43-262 (2d Sess. 1875).
83. See H.R. REP. NO. 44-799 (1st Sess. 1876).
84. See H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 44-167 (1st Sess. 1876).
85. Gregg found that eleven journalists were called by Congress to testify in the
1880s and twelve in the 1890s. Gregg, supra note 25, at 585-86. Gregg’s count is based
on “cases reported in official journals . . . . There may be other unreported cases.” Id. at
586. For details about some of the late nineteenth-century leak investigations, see
Correspondents and Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 310-66.
86. See 26 CONG. REC. 4848-51 (1894); PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & HOUSE,
supra note 32, at 583-86; Correspondents and Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 340-66.
87. See 26 CONG. REC. 5454-55, 5458-59 (1894); PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE &
HOUSE, supra note 32, at 583-86.
88. News Sources Not Betrayed, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1894, at 1; Editorial, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 1894, at 4.
89. PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & HOUSE, supra note 32, at 828.
90. United States v. Seymour (D.C. 1894), in PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE &
HOUSE, supra note 32, at 855-57. The lower court decisions and the briefs for the
reporters and other defendants, including some discussion of reporters’ privilege, can be
found in PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & HOUSE, supra note 32, at 797-854. Considering
just the demurrer, the Supreme Court denied certiorari for one of the non-reporter
defendants. In re Chapman, 156 U.S. 211 (1895). Two years later the Court ruled on the
merits of the case, upholding congressional authority to hold witnesses in contempt when
they refused to cooperate with an investigation. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 668 (1897).
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two years later, however, when a judge found that the testimony sought
by Congress was not essential to its investigation.91
The nineteenth-century leaks and associated investigations did not
produce cohesive public policy or free speech rationales behind the use
of anonymous sources. One study found that seventy percent of journalists
complied when called to testify before Congress; forty-one named
sources and 115 provided other information.92 Sixty-six refused to
cooperate and some were held in contempt of Congress; of these, eleven
were confined.93 Journalists who resisted answering questions about
their sources typically relied on personal honor—they had given their
word—as the basis for doing so during the first half of the century.94
Later in the century, in keeping with the emergence of an occupational
self-consciousness, journalists increasingly relied on professional honor
as the justification for keeping confidences.95 This rationale sometimes
included assertions about the importance of confidential sources in
assuring the flow of information to the public.96 The journalists did not,
however, rely on freedom of the press in their defense. In only three
instances did journalists or their allies even obliquely invoke the First
Amendment or use language reminiscent of its press clause.97
91. Unreported decision discussed in The Inviolability of Confidential Communications
to Newspaper Reporters, 55 ALB. L.J. 430 (1897). The judge reviewing the indictment
made a passing reference to the nation’s first state shield law adopted the previous year
and noted claims about confidentiality in reporters’ work, but declined to recognize an
evidentiary privilege for journalists. Id. at 430-31; see also Aaron David Gordon,
Protection of News Sources: The History and Legal Status of the Newsman’s Privilege
193-94 (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin) (on file with
the University of Wisconsin Library).
92. Gregg, supra note 25, at 526; see also id. at 532-34 (providing reasons why
most journalists did testify).
93. Kaminski found that eleven nineteenth-century journalists—counting twice
one journalist who was involved in two incidents six years apart—were confined for
refusing to answer questions as part of congressional leak inquiries. Correspondents and
Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 371 & n.6.
94. Correspondents and Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 368; Gregg, supra note
25, at 532.
95. Correspondents and Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 368.
96. Id. The public’s right to know argument could also be inverted, as it was by
some editorialists, to oppose journalistic confidentiality. Reporters who agreed to testify
about sources or secret information provided the public with additional details it needed
to know, especially for stories about corruption in government. This was a common
refrain in the editorial responses to Simonton’s 1857 refusal to testify. See Gregg, supra
note 25, at 389-92.
97. Correspondents and Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 369-85. Although the
First Amendment is reflexively invoked in all manner of controversies today, most
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B. Leaks and Reporter-Source Relations in the Administrative State
The communication strategies of politicians, government officials,
business leaders, and even social movements shifted with the ascendancy of
the commercial mass media in the late nineteenth century.98 Individuals
and groups discovered that successful communication required more
than issuing their own publications or cooperating with like-minded
media outlets. Those seeking to influence public opinion and shape policy
instead scrambled to get their messages into the commercial mass media,
and gaining access meant making information newsworthy enough to
satisfy the demands of professional communicators.99 News—both its
informational and symbolic content—formed the connective tissue in a
society where civic decisionmaking was dispersed among branches and
levels of government, between the private and public sectors, and
through all manner of associations.100
News leaks figured centrally in this new milieu of political
communication, especially as reporters and sources renegotiated their
relationship between the turn of the century and the New Deal. Unlike
journalists at the center of nineteenth-century leak investigations, who
typically wrote as avowedly partisan functionaries,101 the new breed of
reporters attained significant occupational autonomy, especially those in
the Washington press corps. Reporters demonstrated professional success
through prowess in cultivating sources rather than by advancing a

doctrines derived from it were crafted after World War I. The two leading studies of
nineteenth-century understandings of press freedom do not mention journalists’
confidentiality. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING
PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000);
DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS (1997).
98. By the outset of the twentieth century, newspapers increasingly identified
themselves as business or social institutions rather than as political organs. They
appealed to heterogeneous audiences or a class of readers in their market with news
articles that minimized or sublimated political ideology. See GERALD J. BALDASTY, THE
COMMERCIALIZATION OF NEWS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1992).
99. See generally James W. Carey, The Communications Revolution and the
Professional Communicator, in SOC. REV.: MONOGRAPH NO. 13, at 23 (Paul Halmos ed.,
1969) (discussing the emergence of reporters as an occupation that brokers information
and symbols between the various sectors of society).
100. See id.; COOK, supra note 18, at 17-60.
101. For excellent discussions of the many ways in which politics and journalism
insinuated themselves into each other’s realm from the end of the Civil War to the close
of the century, see generally RICHARD L. KAPLAN, POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN PRESS:
THE RISE OF OBJECTIVITY, 1865-1920 (2002); SUMMERS, supra note 59. Quite a few
Washington correspondents from the Civil War to the early 1900s held patronage
appointments as clerks of congressional committees. This supplemented their income as
writers and gave them easier access to information, including confidential intelligence.
See RITCHIE, supra note 35, at 62-64, 71-72, 75-77, 98-99, 109, 153, 171-72, 183-84,
192-94, 206.
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publisher’s or party’s agenda.102 Sources adjusted to this new environment
by pursuing two general strategies. One tack was simply to assist
reporters’ newsgathering efforts through press offices, press releases,
press conferences and the like.103 Sources also exploited the values and
routines of journalists to cultivate favorable coverage. They carefully
timed the release of news, played reporters against one another, staged
newsworthy events, and generally tried to regulate the terms on which
news flowed to the public.104 The calculated release of information from
unnamed sources—leaks—thus became one news management tool
among many in a source’s repertoire.
Congress and the White House began institutionalizing the techniques
of modern news management, including news leaks, by the 1890s.
Lawmakers in the leak-prone Senate discovered that they could
communicate with constituents in home districts by leaking stories to
favorite reporters. The reporters, in return, discovered that editors played up
such stories over routine news.105 One correspondent who had been the
target of a leak investigation explained the symbiotic relationship in 1897:
Members of Congress, of course, have their own particular fortunes to consider,
and, finding it necessary to use the newspapers for the purpose of reaching the
ears of their constituents and the voters generally, frequently give reliable
information of a confidential nature and in advance of general publicity to
correspondents with whom they desire to be on friendly terms.106

The reporter added that cabinet members also “occasionally ‘leak[ed]’
on some live topic of news” when it suited their purposes, but “not
because they desire[d] to do a favor to the newspaper correspondent and
through him to the dear public.”107

102. See generally LEO C. ROSTEN, THE WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENTS (1937)
(finding that many members of the Washington press corps enjoyed considerable
autonomy in their work and had closer relations with their sources than with their
publishers, with whom they often politically disagreed).
103. On the emergence of public relations in Progressive Era politics, see COOK,
supra note 18, at 44-52; STUART EWEN, PR!: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF SPIN 39-137 (1996).
104. See RITCHIE, supra note 35, at 131-44, 179; Lili Levi, Dangerous Liaisons:
Seduction and Betrayal in Confidential Press-Source Relations, 43 RUTGERS L. REV.
609, 677-83 (1991).
105. See RITCHIE, supra note 35, at 132, 164, 167-68. An 1890 Senate leak
investigation, unproductive like most before it, confirmed that lawmakers regularly
dispensed supposedly secret information to reporters. Id. at 168-69.
106. David S. Barry, News-Getting at the Capital, 26 THE CHAUTAUQUAN, 282, 282
(1897).
107. Id.
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The White House had remained in the shadow of Congress as a news
making institution for most of the nineteenth century. But the SpanishAmerican War and the administration of Theodore Roosevelt moved the
presidency onto the journalistic center stage.108 A masterful news maker,
Roosevelt incorporated leaks into his policymaking maneuvers.109 He floated
trial balloons to test public reaction to policy options without formally
committing to them.110 If the response seemed positive, the White House
embraced the proposal; if negative, the President denied the veracity of a
report based on unnamed sources.111 Roosevelt also anonymously released
information that might alienate political allies so they would not hold
him responsible for the bad news, information that appeared self-serving
if attributed to the White House, and information that undercut
congressional opposition to bills he favored.112 “Roosevelt even appreciated
the nuances in choosing the recipients of leaks. All things being equal,
he preferred the stories to appear in opposition newspapers because the
gambit was less transparent that way.”113 Roosevelt recognized that
effective political communication depended more on shaping newspapers’
front page reports than their editorial columns, a marked departure from
nineteenth-century political uses of the press.114
Roosevelt and all subsequent Presidents discovered that leaks not
authorized by the White House subverted their efforts to engineer public
consent. For instance, Roosevelt’s unofficial press secretary devoted
considerable energy to investigating the source of unauthorized leaks.115
“The President says it looks as if there is a leak in the Department,” the
aide wrote to cabinet officials, “and he would like to be advised if you
know how the information got out.”116 Such leaks sprang from various
executive departments and Roosevelt devoted an entire cabinet meeting
to discussing the problem.117

108. See STEPHEN PONDER, MANAGING THE PRESS: ORIGINS OF THE MEDIA PRESIDENCY,
1897-1933, at 1-15 (1998) (discussing the shift in media attention from Congress to the
presidency and the growing sophistication of the White House in managing news).
109. See GEORGE JUERGENS, NEWS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE: THE PRESIDENTIALPRESS RELATIONSHIP IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 1-90 (1981); JOHN TEBBEL & SARAH
MILES WATTS, THE PRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY: FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO
RONALD REAGAN 318-48 (1985).
110. JUERGENS, supra note 109, at 41-42.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 43-45; ELMER E. CORNWELL, JR., PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP OF PUBLIC
OPINION 18 (1965).
113. JUERGENS, supra note 109, at 44.
114. Id. at 5-13.
115. See LOUIS W. KOENIG, THE INVISIBLE PRESIDENCY 177 (1960).
116. Id.
117. Id.; see also PONDER, supra note 108, at 48 (discussing Roosevelt’s efforts to
quash unauthorized leaks).
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Although the unauthorized release of news did little to derail
Roosevelt’s agenda, his successor found it more than a mere annoyance.
William Howard Taft, who did not share Roosevelt’s instincts for dealing
with reporters, sometimes saw his indiscreet private remarks appear in
published reports attributed to unnamed sources.118 Even more damaging to
Taft was a 1909 publicity war fought by two administration officials over
federal conservation policy.119 Officials held over from the Roosevelt
administration deftly deployed leaks to undermine Taft’s position.120
The role of leaks in both the international and domestic dimensions of
foreign policymaking became apparent during the administration of
President Woodrow Wilson. At first, Wilson enjoyed modest success in
minimizing negative leaks and maximizing favorable ones.121 After
World War I, however, leaks gutted his efforts to temper some of the
harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles and to win domestic approval for
his international agenda.122 During secret treaty negotiations in Paris,
the British and especially the French leaked material to their journalists
in an effort to gain advantages over Wilson at the bargaining table.123
British Prime Minister Lloyd George even apologized to Wilson for
particularly embarrassing leaks from his delegation and banished the
offending diplomat and journalist.124 Perhaps most frustrating for
Wilson, the leakers aimed to strengthen the hand of Republican Senators
who opposed his idealistic peacemaking efforts in Europe, and who later
voted to keep the United States from joining the League of Nations.125
Partly because of such policy failures and Presidential misstatements,
Wilson and his two successors in the White House began directing that
reporters attribute some information to “an official spokesman,” “a
White House official,” or “a high authority.”126
The explosive growth of the federal government during the New Deal
and World War II fueled a corresponding expansion in agencies’ public

118. See PONDER, supra note 108, at 54.
119. Id. at 63-75.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 85-90.
122. JUERGENS, supra note 109, at 235-44.
123. Id. at 238-41.
124. Id. at 236.
125. Id. at 239, 262-64.
126. SILAS BENT, BALLYHOO: THE VOICE OF THE PRESS 76-81 (1927); CORNWELL,
supra note 112, at 65; POLLARD, supra note 26, at 716; ROSTEN, supra note 102, at 24-25.

445

KIELBOWICZ.POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC

11/9/2006 2:33 PM

information efforts and in the size of the Washington press corps.127
Leaks to the press flourished in this environment as a way to inform and
persuade the public about increasingly complex public affairs. Franklin
Roosevelt skillfully deployed leaks as part of his administration’s wellorchestrated multichannel communication campaigns.128 This controlled,
strategic news release exemplified how a modern ethos of reportersource relations supplanted the rules that had governed nineteenth-century
partisan journalism. By the mid-twentieth century, leaks had become
a transaction in which reporters and sources each derived advantages
regardless of their partisan inclinations. Like his distant cousin
Theodore, Franklin Roosevelt often leaked to papers that editorially
opposed his policies in order to heighten the credibility of the anonymous
communication.129 For their part, reporters welcomed leaks regardless
of their political opinions about a source because doing so boosted their
standing as enterprising newsgatherers.
Even in security conscious Washington during World War II, leaks
sprang from all manner of institutions to enrich political communication
among elites while informing the public. Leaks had become “essential
to the operation of the democracy in these complex times,” according to
government administrator and later Civil War historian Bruce Catton.130
[I]t is through the leak that the people are kept in touch with their
government. . . . It is the leak which enables them to know whether the fine
boasts and pretensions of an appointed person are really justified. It is the
leak—telling them what may happen, what is being planned, what the carefully
hidden facts actually are—which makes it possible for them to react while there
is still time and thus exert an influence on the handling of affairs.131

Although leaking was “frequently misused by self-seekers and schemers”
and often made officials look inefficient, “our particular form of
government wouldn’t work without it.”132

127. See JAMES L. MCCAMY, GOVERNMENT PUBLICITY: ITS PRACTICE IN FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATION (1939); RICHARD W. STEELE, PROPAGANDA IN AN OPEN SOCIETY: THE
ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION AND THE MEDIA, 1933-1941 (1985).
128. The best discussion of Franklin Roosevelt’s press relations is BETTY HOUCHIN
WINFIELD, FDR AND THE NEWS MEDIA (1990). For examples of Roosevelt’s use of leaks
for a variety of political and policy purposes, see id. at 66, 133, 142-43.
129. DONALD A. RITCHIE, REPORTING FROM WASHINGTON: THE HISTORY OF THE
WASHINGTON PRESS CORPS 10 (2005).
130. BRUCE CATTON, THE WAR LORDS OF WASHINGTON 89 (1948).
131. Id. at 87.
132. Id.
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III. THE MARGINAL PROTECTION FOR LEAKS AFFORDED BY
JOURNALISTS’ CONFIDENTIALITY LAW
The facts in Branzburg v. Hayes,133 the Supreme Court’s seminal
analysis of journalists’ asserted constitutional privilege, had nothing to
do with leaks of government information. The Court synthesized its
decision from a modest body of law that had been developing since the
late 1800s, which also never significantly addressed the importance of
political or policy leaks. Nonetheless, as the Court’s only ruling dealing
centrally with journalists’ privilege,134 this 1972 decision often proves
decisive when leaks raise questions about confidentiality law.
A. Pre-Branzburg Confidentiality Law and Leaks
The major legal principles governing confidentiality developed from
the common law, statutes, and constitutional interpretation, with only
occasional glances at the special role that leaks play in governance.
Protecting the confidentiality of leakers nevertheless found some support
at the margins of the law.
1. Mainstream Developments in Confidentiality Law
Confidentiality disputes arising from contexts other than congressional
investigations began reaching the courts in the late 1880s. Most reported
decisions stemmed from one of three situations: when reporters refused
to provide prosecutors with information or the identity of sources used in
writing stories about criminal activities,135 identify sources for articles
that breached the secrecy or challenged the integrity of grand jury
proceedings,136 or disclose sources sought by plaintiffs in libel suits.137
133. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
134. DIENES, LEVINE & LIND, supra note 3, at 917, 930.
135. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F. Supp. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1970);
People v. Durrant, 48 P. 75, 86 (Cal. 1897); Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1950);
State v. Donovan, 30 A.2d 421 (N.J. 1943).
136. See, e.g., Joslyn v. People, 184 P. 375 (Colo. 1919); People ex rel. Mooney v.
Sheriff of New York County, 199 N.E. 415 (N.Y. 1936).
137. See, e.g., Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
910 (1958); Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957);
Pledger v. State, 3 S.E. 320 (Ga. 1887); Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 123 A.2d 473
(N.J. 1956); Clinton v. Commercial Tribune Co., 8 Ohio N.P. 655 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1901);
see also, e.g., In re Goodfader’s Appeal, 367 P.2d 472 (Haw. 1961) (seeking journalist’s
testimony for a suit challenging the firing of a public employee).
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Reported cases invariably held that, absent statutory protection, the
common law did not recognize a testimonial privilege for the press.138
In rejecting journalists’ claims, courts and commentators frequently
invoked Wigmore’s admonition against any expansion of testimonial
privileges.139
The most important pre-Branzburg confidentiality case testing
journalists’ constitutional claims arose from a 1965 libel action involving
celebrity gossip, a situation far removed from the typical government
leak case. In Garland v. Torre,140 columnist Marie Torre published
critical remarks about singer Judy Garland’s physical appearance and
performance attributed to an unnamed television executive.141 To advance
her libel suit, Garland sought the identity of the unnamed source. Torre
refused, relying principally on a constitutional argument that compelling
testimony “would impose an important practical restraint on the flow of
news from news sources to news media and would thus diminish pro
tanto the flow of news to the public.”142 The appellate court opinion by
Judge Potter Stewart, written shortly before he joined the Supreme
Court, acknowledged that forced disclosure had First Amendment
implications and could indeed compromise newsgathering.143 But
because the source’s identity went to the heart of the libel claim and
could not be discovered by alternative means, the court found that “the
interest to be served by compelling the testimony of the witness . . .
justifies some impairment of this First Amendment freedom.”144
Journalists fared better in some state legislatures, winning passage of
shield laws that established a basis for refusing to testify in many
circumstances. Maryland adopted the first shield law in 1896,145 and a
138. “In the view of the reported cases, no testimonial privilege exists, save in those
twelve states where such a privilege is specifically set out by statute.” W. D. Lorensen,
Note, The Journalist and His Confidential Source: Should a Testimonial Privilege Be
Allowed?, 35 NEB. L. REV. 562, 562 (1956). The Supreme Court reached the same
conclusion seventeen years later. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 685 (1972) (“At
common law, courts consistently refused to recognize the existence of any privilege
authorizing a newsman to refuse to reveal confidential information to a grand jury.”).
139. See, e.g., Donovan, 30 A.2d at 426 (citing 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2286 (3d
ed. 1940)) (criticizing journalists’ shield laws to justify why New Jersey’s statute should
be construed narrowly in this case). For two examples of how Wigmore dominated legal
thinking about the merits of journalists’ confidentiality, see Lorensen, supra note 138, at
563; LeGrand C. Tibbits, Note, Privilege of a Newspaper Reporter to Refuse to Testify
Concerning Information Confidentially Received, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 115, 116-18 (1936).
140. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).
141. MARIE TORRE, DON’T QUOTE ME 34-37 (1965).
142. Garland, 259 F.2d at 547-48 (quoting Appellant’s Brief).
143. Id. at 548-49.
144. Id. at 548; see Comment, Confidentiality of News Sources Under the First
Amendment, 11 STAN. L. REV. 541 (1959).
145. David Gordon, The 1896 Maryland Shield Law: The American Roots of
Evidentiary Privilege for Newsmen, JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS, No. 22 (1972).
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widely publicized 1936 New York confidentiality case mobilized press
associations to lobby for similar laws elsewhere.146 By the time
Branzburg reached the Supreme Court, seventeen states had granted
journalists an evidentiary privilege through statute.147 Several times
between 1929 and 1972 Congress also considered the privilege, but
stopped short of enacting a federal shield law.148
2. Protection for Leaks on the Margins
Some pre-Branzburg legal actions involving leaks did favor the press,
though they had limited precedential value. Most notably, by 1970 the
majority of state shield laws afforded special protection to journalists’
sources as distinct from the contents of their confidential communications.149
For instance, Alabama’s absolute protection for source identity prevented a
libel plaintiff from compelling a journalist to name officials in the state
prison system who had leaked information about abuses over a number
of years.150
The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination provided more
oblique protection for leaks. The Supreme Court in 1914 upheld a
journalist’s claim that compelled testimony might violate his right
against self-incrimination.151 A city editor who had written articles
about customs fraud refused to reveal his sources to a federal grand jury
146. People ex. rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County, 199 N.E. 415 (N.Y.
1936); see also Walter A. Steigleman, Newspaper Confidence Laws—Their Extent and
Provisions, 20 JOURNALISM Q. 230, 233-34 (1943). This case also prompted the first
flurry of law review commentaries on journalists’ privilege. See, e.g., Recent Case, Duty
of Reporter to Disclose Name of Informer, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 680 (1935); Albert D. Nohr,
Recent Case, People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 199 N.E. (N.Y. 1936), 11 WIS. L. REV.
576 (1936); Note, Privilege of Newspapermen to Withhold Sources of Information from
the Court, 45 YALE L.J. 357 (1935).
147. DIENES, LEVINE & LIND, supra note 3, at 912-13, n.20.
148. See N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM’N, LEG. DOC. NO. 65(A): REP. & STUDY
RELATING TO PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN CONFERRING UPON NEWSPAPERMEN A PRIVILEGE
WHICH WOULD LEGALLY PROTECT THEM FROM DIVULGING SOURCES OF INFORMATION
GIVEN TO THEM 38-73 (1949) (reprinting all the bills introduced into Congress between
1929 and 1943); MAURICE VAN GERPEN, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AND THE PRESS
29-57, 127 (1979) (listing shield bills introduced before 1975).
149. See Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a
Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 321 (1970) (detailing the statutory
privileges shielding the identities of journalists’ informants available in some states on
the eve of Branzburg).
150. Ex parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351, 352 (N.D. Ala. 1953) (relying on ALA. CODE
tit. 7, § 370 (1940)).
151. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94 (1915).
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on the grounds that he might incriminate himself.152 President Wilson
granted him a pardon, and he was held in contempt when he still refused
to testify.153 The Supreme Court recognized the editor’s right to decline
the pardon, and thereby avoid testifying, in an opinion criticized for
opening a backdoor to journalists’ confidentiality.154 In later cases,
prosecutors simply offered reporters immunity to circumvent their Fifth
Amendment claims.155
Unreported decisions, which comprise the majority of pre-Branzburg
confidentiality cases,156 furnished support for protecting source identities
in stories based on leaks. For instance, reporters who wrote about
misconduct and graft in state agencies sometimes rebuffed efforts to
uncover their sources.157 When a reporter for the Nashville Tennesseean
refused in 1948 to reveal his sources for a story about police officers
aiding bootleggers, the judge accepted a claim of journalists’ privilege
for stories exposing wrongdoing in government.158 The judge concluded
that the press necessarily receives much information given in confidence. “I
am unable to hold the witness in contempt on this matter. It’s true it is
hard to have serious charges made against a public official on hearsay
evidence, but at times much good has been done in this way.”159
Congress similarly and repeatedly stopped short of forcing reporters to
identify sources for stories based on leaks in the decades before
Branzburg. Lawmakers often sympathized with journalists’ confidentiality
152. Id. at 85; see also RICHARD KLUGER, THE PAPER: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE
NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE 187-89 (1986) (discussing the case from the newspaper’s
perspective).
153. Burdick, 236 U.S. at 85-86.
154. See 2 CHAFEE, supra note 18, at 498 (“He got all the practical advantage of a
special newspaper privilege by dressing himself up in the United States Constitution.”);
Note, Effect of an Unaccepted Pardon upon the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 28
HARV. L. REV. 609 (1915).
155. In Branzburg, the Court noted that prosecutors sometimes offered immunity to
reporters who invoked their right against self-incrimination as the basis for refusing to
testify. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 702 n.39 (1972).
156. “It should be noted that the great majority of cases on this subject are
unreported.” Note, The Right of a Newsman to Refrain from Divulging the Sources of
His Information, 36 VA. L. REV. 61, 61 n.3 (1950).
157. For example, a reporter refused to identify his sources for a story about the
Pennsylvania liquor board’s violations of procedures in issuing a license. See Right to
Withhold News Source Upheld, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Dec. 9, 1933, at 16. A year later
another reporter rebuffed attempts to uncover his sources for a story about graft at the
Illinois Emergency Relief Commission. See Chicago Court Defers Contempt Ruling,
EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Aug. 4, 1934, at 1; Court Drops Sloan Contempt Charge, EDITOR
& PUBLISHER, Aug. 11, 1934, at 10; Judge Backs Chicago Reporter, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,
1934, at 13; Sloan Case Based on Legal Myths, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Aug. 11, 1934, at
11.
158. Court Upholds Press on Shielding Source, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1948, at 25;
Judge Frees Reporter, Then Adds Praise, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, June 5, 1948, at 64.
159. Court Upholds Press on Shielding Source, supra note 158, at 25.
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claims. In one instance, a reporter’s account of shortcomings in Veterans
Administration hospitals, based on information from unnamed officials,
triggered a 1945 congressional investigation.160 Citing professional
ethics, the reporter refused to reveal his sources.161 Committee members
initially voted to hold him in contempt but reversed their decision after
hearing from a number of colleagues.162 “To compel a member of the
newspaper profession to expose the source of his information would, in
many instances revolt against the public good,” one representative told
the House.163 Nearly twenty years later, columnist Jack Anderson
refused to identify sources who told him that members of Congress
cheated on payrolls and expense accounts, but the investigating
committee accepted his assertion that “reporters had a constitutional
right to protect their sources.”164
Other investigatory bodies also backed down when reporters refused
to reveal their sources. In 1955, a Washington Post reporter declined to
tell the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) who leaked information

160. See Investigation of the Veterans’ Administration with a Particular View to
Determining the Efficiency of the Administration and Operation of Veterans’
Administration Facilities: Hearings on H.R. Res. 192 Before the H. Comm. on World
War Veterans’ Legislation, pt. 1, 79th Cong. 165, 171 (1945) [hereinafter Investigation
of the Veterans’ Administration]; House Body Defers News Source Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 1945, at 17; Charles Hurd, The Veteran, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1945, at 21; Story
of Beating of Veterans Waits, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1945, at 20.
161. See Investigation of the Veterans’ Administration, supra note 160, at 171
(testimony of Albert Deutsch, reporter for the newspaper PM).
162. Id. at 172, 182-83, 342; 91 CONG. REC. 4847, 4859, App. 2554 (1945)
(remarks of Reps. Kopplemann, O’Toole, and Biemiller, all speaking in favor of
respecting the reporter’s confidentiality).
163. 91 CONG. REC. 4859 (1945) (remarks of Rep. O’Toole). In another 1940s
incident with a similar outcome, a House committee investigating labor disruptions in
Pacific combat areas ordered a newspaper editor to identify the sources for his story.
Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Naval Affairs of Sundry Legislation Affecting the
Naval Establishment: Hearings before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Naval Affairs
No. 30, 78th Cong. 197 (1944). When the editor refused, the committee backed down,
noting that having the names “would have been helpful . . . . We are aware, however, of
the customary practice of newspapers in not revealing the sources of such stories.” Id. at
199.
164. See List of ‘Cheaters’ Spurned in House, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1963, at 22; see
also JACK ANDERSON, WASHINGTON EXPOSE 44-45 (1967) (asserting that Congress did
not want him to reveal too many details about congressional corruption). In another
congressional investigation the same year, a reporter refused to disclose his sources for a
story that raised questions about the fairness of the Pentagon’s procedures for letting
contracts. Reporter Refuses to Tell Senate Who Gave Him Data on the TFX, N.Y. TIMES,
May 25, 1963, at 6.
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from the National Security Council (NSC).165 The FBI dropped the
matter when the reporter assured agents that he had not seen actual NSC
documents.166 In another instance, a series of articles for the Arizona
Republic about corruption at two state commissions prompted grand jury
and legislative investigations; the reporter successfully resisted efforts to
learn who had leaked key information.167
B. Branzburg v. Hayes
When the question of journalists’ confidentiality reached the Supreme
Court in 1972, the contours of the law were clear. The First Amendment
furnished weak support at best, the common law resisted efforts to
recognize evidentiary privileges, and state shield laws provided varying
degrees of protection.168 Furthermore, confidentiality law made no
distinction between cases involving leaks from government and those
where journalists had witnessed crimes or had defamed someone using
unnamed sources. Unreported cases and congressional actions that
exhibited sympathy for journalists’ claims in situations involving leaks
carried little precedential weight.
The four cases consolidated in Branzburg v. Hayes grew out of
governmental attempts to exploit the media’s information gathering
activities for its own criminal investigations of counterculture and
dissident political activities.169 Possibly hundreds of subpoenas were
issued to news organizations in the late 1960s to identify sources or turn
over information about the Black Panther Party, Students for a
Democratic Society, drug use, anti-Vietnam War organizing, and
kindred activities.170 In two of the cases that ended up at the Supreme
Court, reporter Paul Branzburg declined to testify before a grand jury
about illicit drug activities he had witnessed while preparing an article
165. CHALMERS M. ROBERTS, FIRST ROUGH DRAFT: A JOURNALIST’S JOURNAL OF
OUR TIMES 125-26 (1973); James Reston, Reporter Is Queried on Security ‘Leaks,’ N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 1955 at 1.
166. ROBERTS, supra note 165, at 125; Reston, supra note 165, at 1, 63.
167. Jack Langguth, Arizona Presses Bribery Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1964, at
75; Jack Langguth, 4th Arizona Aide Will Go on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1964, at 18.
168. The state of journalists’ confidentiality law on the eve of Branzburg is
conveniently summarized in DIENES, LEVINE & LIND, supra note 3, at 910-13.
169. “Government prosecutors and legislators actively sought the assistance,
voluntary or otherwise, of reporters who had established valuable confidential contacts
with the leaders and rank-and-file members of these ‘subversive’ groups.” John E.
Osborn, The Reporter’s Confidentiality Privilege: Updating the Empirical Evidence
After a Decade of Subpoenas, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 60 (1985); see also VAN
GERPEN, supra note 148, at 29-57 (discussing subpoenas issued to the press as part of the
government’s investigation of the counterculture).
170. See Sherwood, supra note 12, at 1202; see also Osborn, supra note 169, at 5961; Note, supra note 149, at 317.
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for the Louisville Courier-Journal.171 Both of the other appeals considered
in Branzburg involved reporters’ refusals to testify before grand juries
investigating the Black Panther Party’s possible criminal activities.172
Of the four cases, United States v. Caldwell presented the strongest
claim for recognizing journalists’ confidentiality,173 and it was the only
one in which the press prevailed in the lower courts. New York Times
reporter Earl Caldwell testified that he was among the few journalists
working for the mainstream media who had successfully cultivated
sources in the Black Panther Party.174 Caldwell claimed that vital
sources would refuse to deal with him once he stepped inside the grand
jury room.175 Affidavits from prominent journalists supported his
assertion about the value of confidential sources.176 Despite the district
court’s willingness to issue a protective order shielding Caldwell’s
“confidential associations, sources or information received,” the New
York Times reporter still refused to appear and was held in contempt.177
The appeals court vacated the contempt citation, recognizing that the
“public’s First Amendment right to be informed” conferred a qualified
constitutional right on the press to refuse to testify.178
The Supreme Court disagreed. Although the majority conceded that
compelling journalists to testify imposed some burden on newsgathering,
“the evidence fails to demonstrate that there would be a significant
constriction of the flow of news to the public if this Court reaffirms the
prior common-law and constitutional rule regarding the testimonial
obligations of newsmen.”179 Looking beyond the cases at hand, Justice
171. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 345-46 (Ky. 1970), aff’d sub nom.,
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748, 749
(Ky. 1971), aff’d sub nom., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
172. In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971), aff’d sub nom., Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); In re Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970), rev’d,
Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev’d sub nom., Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
173. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
174. Id. at 1087 n.7 (reprinting testimony from Caldwell); see also Newsmen’s
Privilege: Hearings on H.R. 717 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong. 39-43 (1973) (statement of Earl Caldwell about the problems he
faced in reporting on the Black Panthers and the complications caused by the
government’s efforts to use him as a source of information about the Party) [hereinafter
1973 House Hearings].
175. Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1088 n.7.
176. Id. at 1084.
177. Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. at 362; Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1081.
178. Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1089.
179. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693 (1972).
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White observed that “from the beginning of our country the press has
operated without constitutional protection for press informants, and the
press has flourished.”180 The interests of the press thus must yield to the
“longstanding principle that the ‘public . . . has a right to every man’s
evidence,’” especially for grand jury proceedings.181
Despite the majority’s holding, several aspects of the Court’s decision
held open the possibility of recognizing some claims to protect
confidentiality, perhaps including those involving leaks. First, the opinion
twice acknowledged that “news gathering is not without its First
Amendment protections.”182 Second, the four cases decided in Branzburg
all involved efforts to compel testimony before grand juries. Indeed, the
Court repeatedly framed its analysis in terms of its import for grand
juries, suggesting a limitation on its reach, and many lower courts
interpreted it accordingly.183 Third, the majority opinion focused on
confidentiality in cases dealing with criminal activity; nowhere did it
address confidentiality in connection with leaks from government.184
The concurring and dissenting opinions furnish additional support for
construing Branzburg narrowly enough to protect the confidentiality of
leaks from government sources. Providing the majority’s necessary fifth
vote, Justice Powell’s concurring opinion emphasized “the limited
nature of the Court’s holding.”185 He underscored the importance of
striking a balance between “the obligation of all citizens to give relevant
testimony” and the interests of the press “on a case-by-case basis.”186
This single passage “has formed the cornerstone of much subsequent
constitutional law on the subject,” according to one treatise.187
Justice Stewart’s dissent also exerted unusual influence on subsequent
developments. The three-part test he fashioned has been followed by many

180. Id. at 698-99.
181. Id. at 688 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
182. Id. at 681, 707. But the Court held that the compelled testimony at issue here
imposed an incidental burden on the press and not a “prior restraint or restriction on what
the press may publish.” Id. at 681.
183. “The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury
subpoenas . . . .” Id. at 682; see also id. at 687-88, 701-02 (addressing assertions of
journalists’ confidentiality in a grand jury context). Absent statutory protection, courts
considering the scope of a common law or constitutional privilege have been most
reluctant to recognize it when journalists have been called to testify before a grand jury.
See DIENES, LEVINE & LIND, supra note 3, at 1066-69.
184. In reciting the facts presented by the three cases, the Court emphasized the
journalists’ knowledge of other parties’ possible criminal activity. See Branzburg, 408
U.S. at 667-79.
185. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 710.
187. DIENES, LEVINE & LIND, supra note 3, at 926.
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lower courts and mirrors the elements of most shield laws.188 Believing
that the “right to gather news” implied “a right to a confidential relationship
between a reporter and his source,” Stewart shifted the presumption in
favor of the press.189 Before forcing disclosure, he would require the
government to prove that a journalist has relevant information, not
obtainable by alternative means, for which there is a “compelling and
overriding interest.”190 In a separate dissent, Justice Douglas recognized
an absolute right for journalists to maintain their confidences.191 In an
observation with special import for leaks, Douglas praised the role of
journalistic confidentiality in exposing government’s inner workings to
public scrutiny.192
C. Confidentiality Law and Leaks from Branzburg to the CIA Leak Case
The press pursued two strategies in the wake of the Court’s Branzburg
decision. In the short term, journalists pushed for more shield laws,
especially at the federal level.193 The effort fell short in Congress but
presented an opportunity for the press to articulate the importance of
protecting confidences in reporting on government. In the longer term,
and with considerable success, the press and its legal advocates argued
that courts should use the three-part test from Stewart’s dissenting
opinion in deciding confidentiality cases.194 This approach provided
considerable protection for a wide range of cases, but it did little to
recognize leaks as a form of political communication.
1. Leaks and the Campaign for a Federal Shield Law
Though it declined to recognize journalists’ First Amendment
confidentiality claims, the Branzburg majority invited Congress and the
188. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting). “The Stewart approach now
governs much of the law of journalist’s privilege in the context of civil and criminal
proceedings. The three-part test of Stewart’s Branzburg dissent has thus become enormously
important.” DONALD M. GILLMOR, ET AL., MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 363 (5th ed. 1990).
189. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 728.
190. Id. at 743.
191. Id. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 722.
193. See VAN GERPEN, supra note 148, at 147-70 (reviewing efforts to secure a
shield law in Congress).
194. See Lawrence J. Mullen, Comment, Developments in the News Media
Privilege: The Qualified Constitutional Approach Becoming Common Law, 33 ME. L.
REV. 401, 419 (1981).
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states to extend a statutory privilege to the press.195 One day after the
ruling, a Senator introduced the first of dozens of bills considered by
Congress through the mid-1970s to protect journalists’ sources and
confidential information.196 The congressional hearings focused, at most,
modest attention on the importance of news leaks from government
sources.197 In arguing for the merits of shield legislation, the press and
its allies highlighted a few examples of stories developed through
unnamed sources that exposed government malfeasance.198 More than
one shield law proponent pointed to a recent exposé by the Memphis
Commercial Appeal about problems in state hospitals as illustrating the
need to protect journalists’ confidentiality.199 Witnesses complained that
state authorities devoted more energy to seeking the leak’s source than
addressing the problems.200 Witnesses also mentioned, but did not
explore, the importance of protecting source confidentiality in making
the Pentagon Papers public and in bringing the still unfolding Watergate
scandal to light.201 More frequently, those testifying on behalf of the shield
bills cited examples like those addressed in Branzburg—compelling
195. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706 (majority opinion).
196. Senator Alan Cranston of California, a former wire service reporter, introduced
the bill immediately after the Branzburg decision. See VAN GERPEN, supra note 148, at
149; see also Newsmen’s Privilege: Hearings on S. 36, S. 158, S. 318, S. 451, S. 637, S.
750, S. 870, S. 917, S. 1128, and S.J. Res. 8 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 45-59 (1973) (remarks of Sen.
Cranston); 1973 House Hearings, supra note 174, at 256-64 (testimony of Arthur B.
Hanson, General Counsel, American Newspaper Publishers Association and secretary
for an ad hoc committee of media groups pushing for a federal shield law) (analyzing
differences among the various proposals for a shield law); VAN GERPEN, supra note 148,
at 147-70 (reviewing the failed efforts to pass a federal shield statute in the wake of
Branzburg).
197. For instance, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, citing research
by law professor Vince Blasi, noted that “stories of Government operations involve the
heaviest use of promises of confidentiality with something over one-third of the stories
written said to have been affected by promises of confidentiality.” 1973 House
Hearings, supra note 174, at 12 (remarks of Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr.); see Vince Blasi,
The Newsman’s Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229, 251-53 (1971).
198. See, e.g., Newsmen’s Privilege: Hearings on H.R. 837, 1084, 15891, 15972,
16527, 16713 and 16542 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong. 177-79 (remarks of Sen. Cranston), 218-19 (testimony of Richard Oliver of the
New York Daily News) (1972) [hereinafter 1972 House Hearings]; 1973 House
Hearings, supra note 174, at 61 (testimony on behalf of the Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press), 240 (remarks of A. M. Rosenthal, managing editor, New York
Times).
199. See, e.g., 1972 House Hearings, supra note 198, at 64 (statement of Guy Ryan,
president, Sigma Delta Chi, a professional organization of journalists), 195-97 (remarks
of Rep. Dan Kuykendall of Tennessee).
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., id. at 172-73 (testimony of Rep. Edward I. Koch of New York
mentioning the Pentagon Papers); 1973 House Hearings, supra note 174, at 67
(statement of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press mentioning Watergate).
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reporters to testify about possible criminal activity they witnessed.202
They also focused on the ever-growing number of subpoenas served on
photographers and television journalists for visual evidence sought by
law enforcement.203
The few opponents of shield laws who testified during the congressional
hearings downplayed the need for a federal statute and ignored the
importance of protecting leaks.204 The Department of Justice, represented
by Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia, reassured reporters that
its guidelines for subpoenaing the press guarded against abuses.205 The
guidelines had been issued in August 1970, drafted with the help of
William Rehnquist, head of the Office of Legal Counsel before joining
the Court.206 In presenting the case against a federal shield law, Scalia
offered hypothetical situations in which the media’s insistence on
maintaining confidentiality could cause grave harm.207 The parade of
horrors included reporters who refused to turn over a kidnapper’s
ransom note or a message about a bomber’s threats, television stations
that refused to supply video outtakes needed to investigate demonstrations
or “the attempted assassination of a prominent political figure,”
newspapers that refused to identify the source of illegally released secret
grand jury testimony that “irreparably injur[ed] the reputation of a
prominent individual” who may never be indicted, and reporters who
refused to identify the source from which they obtained properly
classified national defense secrets.208
202. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 174, at 65-68 (statement of the
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press listing post-Branzburg clashes between
prosecutors and the press over confidential sources and information).
203. Id.
204. “With the sole exception of the Department of Justice, witnesses at the [1972
House] hearings, comprising Members of Congress and representatives of organizations,
and so forth, favored some form of privilege.” 1973 House Hearings, supra note 174, at
1 (remarks of Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier of Wisconsin).
205. See Newsmen’s Privilege: Hearings on H.R. 215 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 6-15 (testimony of Scalia) (1975) [hereinafter 1975 House
Hearings]. The Justice Department guidelines, announced August 10, 1970, are
reprinted in 1972 House Hearings, supra note 198, at 28-29 (current version at 28 C.F.R.
§ 50.10 (2005)).
206. See Lawrence R. Velvel, The Supreme Court Stops the Presses, 22 CATH. U. L.
REV. 324, 341-42 (1973) (arguing that Rehnquist should have recused himself in
Branzburg because he had recently participated in shaping the administration’s policy on
subpoenaing reporters).
207. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 205, at 7.
208. Id.
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In the end, no shield bill made much headway in Congress in the years
immediately after Branzburg. Disagreements among different segments
of the media over the features of a federal shield law undermined the
legislative campaign.209 Initially, much of the press seemed willing to
support a qualified privilege along the lines of Stewart’s three-prong
test.210 But as subpoenas to reporters continued to proliferate, even in
states with shield laws, reporters’ groups increasingly pushed for
unqualified protections.211 The media also divided over who (student
journalists, freelance writers, book authors, photographers, scholars)
should enjoy the protection of a shield law, whether a law should apply
to just federal proceedings or also extend to the states, and other
issues.212 Thus, Congress never came close to a floor vote on federal
shield legislation in the 1970s,213 though several states enacted protections
following the Branzburg decision and several others modified existing
statutes.214
2. Confidentiality Cases and Leaks, 1972-2005
Post-Branzburg confidentiality rulings did not treat unidentified
government sources differently than other types of journalistic informants.215
209. See VAN GERPEN, supra note 148, at 166-69; AM. SOC’Y OF NEWSPAPER
EDITORS, PROBLEMS OF JOURNALISM 178-98 (1973).
210. See, e.g., 1972 House Hearings, supra note 198, at 42 (statement of the
American Society of Newspaper Editors), 55 (Associated Press Managing Editors), 61
(Radio Television News Directors Association), 75 (American Newspaper Publishers
Association); VAN GERPEN, supra note 148, at 149.
211. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 174, at 58, 60, 65-68 (Reporters
Committee), 256 (American Newspaper Publishers Association). In fact, discussions
about shield legislation revealed growing fissures between reporters on the one hand and
editors and publishers on the other. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
which had been formed in 1970 to fight Nixon administration subpoenas, emerged
as and remains the leading advocacy group for reporters, especially when their interests
diverge from those of editors and media owners. See Floyd J. McKay, First Amendment
Guerillas: Formative Years of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 6
JOURNALISM & COMM. MONOGRAPHS 105 (2004).
212. VAN GERPEN, supra note 148, at 150-55, summarizes the debate over which
types of communicators should qualify for the privilege under the proposed federal
shield laws.
213. Apparently only one bill was even reported out of committee. See id. at 169.
214. Between 1973 and 1975 eight states passed shield laws, others modified theirs,
and some considered but rejected a statutory privilege. See id. at 127-28, 202 n.1.
215. Except for a one paragraph discussion of the general contours of confidentiality
law, infra text accompanying notes 216-19, this section focuses on cases in which the
identity of a government source was at issue—that is, cases involving leaks, as defined
supra note 1. This subset of all journalists’ confidentiality cases was constructed from
the Media Law Reporter, which provides more complete coverage for this topic than
other reporters. Nonetheless, there is no easy way to quantify how many confidentiality
cases involve government sources. Indeed, given the nature of this issue—unnamed
sources—it was not entirely clear in a handful of cases in state courts whether the
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Courts weighed the customary media claim that forcing disclosure could
dry up sources and ultimately diminish the flow of information to the
public, but the implications for governance received scant attention.
Except when a state shield law dictated a different outcome, decisions in
confidentiality cases typically applied elements from Stewart’s test or
some variant of them.216 Stewart’s test required the government to prove
that a journalist had relevant information, not otherwise obtainable, for
which there was a compelling interest. In terms of relevance, courts
frowned on fishing expeditions by parties merely hoping to discover
useful evidence in the hands of a reporter.217 Courts also preferred that
parties seeking to breach journalistic confidentiality exhaust other
sources first or at least make a good faith effort to develop the same
information through other channels.218 Courts assessed the compelling
need for the information largely by assigning varying weight to different
legal contexts for which the evidence was sought, whether criminal,
civil, libel, or grand jury.219
Courts usually protected the confidentiality of a reporter’s government
sources when their identity was sought to advance a civil suit.220 For
instance, one cluster of confidentiality cases stemmed from actions by
city, county, or state employees against an agency that had fired or
otherwise punished them; courts rarely compelled reporters to identify
government sources sought for such suits.221 Similarly, demands that

sources were in fact individuals in government. In such situations, contextual clues were
used to include or exclude them from the analysis.
216. See GILLMOR ET AL., supra note 188, at 363.
217. See DIENES, LEVINE & LIND, supra note 3, at 1009-10 (discussing the relevance
requirement recognized in shield laws and in some constitutional and common law
interpretations of a journalist’s privilege).
218. See id. at 1010-13 (discussing the exhaustion requirement).
219. See id. at 1066-89 (discussing confidentiality claims in different proceedings).
220. See, e.g, Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (declining to compel a
newspaper to identify, for purposes of a civil suit, a government source who leaked
transcripts of wiretaps made in an organized crime investigation).
221. See, e.g., In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1983); Green v. Office of the
Sheriff, 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1756 (M.D. Fla. 2002); McKee v. Starkville, 11 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 2312 (N.D. Miss. 1985); Whitney v. O’Hara, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1607 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Connecticut Labor Relations Bd. v. Fagin, 370 A.2d 1095
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1976); Miller v. Greer, 20 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1061 (Ga. Super. Ct.
1992); Waterloo/Cedar Falls Courier v. Hawkeye Cmty. Coll., 646 N.W.2d 97 (Iowa
2002); Wojcik v. Boston Herald Inc., 803 N.E.2d 1261 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004); Sinnott v.
Boston Ret. Bd., 524 N.E.2d 100 (Mass. 1988). But see Trautman v. Dallas Sch. Dist., 8
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1088 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (holding a reporter in contempt for
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reporters identify their government sources in civil suits against the IRS
for leaking information about taxpayers’ records have also been largely
unsuccessful.222 But in one long-running case, courts recently held five
reporters in contempt for refusing to identify sources sought by a
plaintiff suing federal agencies for violating the Privacy Act.223 The appeals
court found that ordering disclosure was the only way the plaintiff could
prove essential elements of his claim.224
Libel suits confounded the usual application of confidentiality
principles in civil actions.225 A federal appeals court noted that “[w]hen
the journalist is a party [in a libel action], and successful assertion of the
refusing to identify, even in camera, the source for a story that led to the dismissal of a
school employee).
222. When a liquor company sued an IRS agent for leaking supposedly confidential
information from a tax audit, it sought to compel a Phoenix newspaper reporter to
identify other unnamed IRS sources. A federal district court rejected the reporter’s claim
based on the First Amendment and the Arizona shield law. United Liquor Co. v. Gard,
88 F.R.D. 123, 131-32 (D. Ariz. 1980). But the court upheld the reporter’s claim that
testifying could violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. United
Liquor v. Gard, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1345, 1349 (D. Ariz. 1981). As the appellate
court noted, federal tax law left open the possibility that publishing such information was
a federal crime. In re Seper, 705 F.2d 1499, 1501 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that 26 U.S.C.
§ 7213(a)(3) made it unlawful to publish tax information “disclosed in a manner
unauthorized by this title . . . .”); see also Bischoff v. United States, 25 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1286 (E.D. Va. 1996) (quashing subpoena requiring a reporter to identify IRS
agents who leaked taxpayers’ records).
223. The Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, creates a right of action against agencies that
improperly disclose personal information about individuals. Dr. Wen Ho Lee, a scientist
employed at the Department of Energy’s Los Alamos laboratory, was suspected of
passing nuclear secrets to the People’s Republic of China. In early 1999, unnamed
sources in the Departments of Justice and Energy and the FBI leaked information about
Lee’s supposed espionage. After further investigation, Lee was indicted on fifty-nine
counts of mishandling computer files; he pleaded guilty to one count and the government
dismissed the rest. In December 1999, Lee sued the three agencies for having leaked
personal information about him and his wife in violation of the Privacy Act. After
extensive discovery, Lee subpoenaed five journalists seeking the identities of the leakers.
A district court ordered five of the journalists to testify. See Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 287
F. Supp. 2d 15, 24-25 (D.D.C. 2003); Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 327 F. Supp. 2d 26, 26-28
(D.D.C. 2004). The appeals court affirmed the order for four, Lee v. Dep’t of Justice,
413 F.3d 53, 61-64 (D.C. Cir. 2005), aff’d 428 F.3d 299 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (4-4
vote), and later a different, fifth reporter was also cited for contempt, Lee v. Dep’t of
Justice, 401 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2005). The case ended in June 2006 when the
government and the five news organizations reached a $1.6 million settlement with Lee.
The news organizations contributed $750,000. “Specialists in media law said such a
payment by news organizations to avoid a contempt sanction was almost certainly
unprecedented.” Adam Liptak, News Media Pay in Scientist Suit, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,
2006, at A1; see also Charles Lane, In Wen Ho Lee Case, a Blow to Journalists After the
Fact, WASH. POST, June 6, 2006, at A3.
224. Lee, 413 F.3d at 60.
225. On the application of confidentiality law when the party from which the
testimony is sought is also the libel defendant, see DIENES, LEVINE & LIND, supra note 3,
at 1077-89; Patrick M. Garry, Anonymous Sources, Libel Law, and the First Amendment,
78 TEMP. L. REV. 579 (2005).
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privilege will effectively shield him from liability, the equities weigh
somewhat more heavily in favor of disclosure.”226 Where shield laws
seemingly protected the press, some courts fashioned a remedy that
presented libel defendants with a difficult choice: they did not have to
disclose their government sources, but neither could they rely on the
existence of the sources in their defense.227
Criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to compel testimony
normally strengthens their claim to override a reporter’s promise of
confidentiality.228 But courts have proven unsympathetic to many such
requests to uncover a reporter’s government sources. Criminal defendants
have failed to force disclosure to support a change of venue,229 impeach
the credibility of government investigators,230 or discover who in a
police department or prosecutor’s office leaked information to the press
during an investigation or trial.231 In ruling against defendants, courts
226. Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
227. See Bufalino v. Associated Press, 692 F.2d 266, 271-72 (2d Cir. 1982);
Newton v. Nat’l Broad., Inc., 109 F.R.D. 522 (D. Nev. 1985); Caldero v. Tribune Publ’g,
562 P.2d 791 (Idaho 1977); Sands v. News America Publ’g Inc., 560 N.Y.S.2d 416 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1990); Sharon v. Time, 599 F. Supp. 538, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying summary
judgment because libel defendant refused to identify government sources); Atlanta
Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting reliance on
a state shield law but finding that the libel plaintiff had not followed customary
discovery procedures); see also Robert G. Berger, The “No-Source” Presumption: The
Harshest Remedy, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 603 (1987) (exploring the implications of directing
a jury to assume that there is no source when media defendants in libel cases refuse to
disclose them to plaintiffs). But see Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 445 A.2d 376 (N.J.
1982) (finding that some state shield laws absolutely protect confidentiality in libel
cases).
228. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
229. North Carolina v. Wallace, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1473 (N.C. Super. Ct.
1995).
230. United States v. Aponte-Vega, 20 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2202 (S.D.N.Y.
1992).
231. United States v. DePalma, 466 F. Supp. 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Rodriguez v.
Superior Court, 601 P.2d 318 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); New Hampshire v. Siel, 444 A.2d
499 (N.H. 1982); State v. Peterson, 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2501 (N.C. Super. Ct.
2003); North Carolina v. Rogers, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1254 (N.C. Super. Ct. 1983).
But see United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that a reporter’s
testimony about a conversation with a U.S. attorney who leaked information is crucial to
defendants’ efforts to establish prosecutorial misconduct). See generally Law Enforcement
and the Media: Information Leaks and the Atlanta Olympic Bombing Investigation:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (reviewing how leaks from law
enforcement agencies can compromise criminal investigations and unfairly brand some
people as suspects).
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generally find that the journalist’s testimony might shed some light on
the conduct of the trial—for example, reveal which parties were talking
to the press—but would not yield exculpatory evidence.232
Despite their secrecy, grand jury proceedings sometimes spring leaks.
Reporters’ efforts to protect their sources, government investigators in
many instances, have met with mixed success.233 Not surprisingly,
courts bristle at leaks from secret grand jury proceedings.234 Reporters
are typically required to testify unless clearly protected by a shield
law,235 or unless they successfully invoke their Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination.236 Journalists’ confidentiality claims based
on protecting the flow of information to the public ring hollow when
leaks spring from grand jury investigations, one court pointedly noted.237
When an official investigation is already underway, it explained, the
press does not serve the public by uncovering government wrongdoing
but instead simply embellishes its report with details gleaned from a
secret grand jury inquiry.238 Courts have similarly ordered reporters to
reveal the identity of sources who leaked sealed court orders.239
Until recently, the factual situation presented in Branzburg, in which
grand juries seek testimony to advance their investigations, rarely
involved efforts to uncover reporters’ government sources.240 Unlike
leaks from grand juries, in these cases the media has independently
developed information sought by grand juries.241 Courts customarily
232. Zelenka v. State, 266 N.W.2d 279 (Wis. 1978).
233. See generally James W. Fox, Jr., The Road Not Taken: Criminal Contempt
Sanctions and Grand Jury Press Leaks, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 505 (1992) (arguing
that holding prosecutors in contempt for leaks from grand juries might be an appropriate
remedy); Daniel C. Richman, Grand Jury Secrecy: Plugging the Leaks in an Empty
Bucket, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 339 (1999) (reviewing the reasons for grand jury secrecy
in light of the leaks from the special prosecutor’s investigation of President Clinton).
234. See Richman, supra note 233.
235. See, e.g., Beach v. Shanley, 465 N.E.2d 304 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1984).
236. Arizona v. Walker, 20 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1645 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 1992).
237. In re Special Proceedings, 291 F. Supp. 2d 44, 59 (D.R.I. 2003).
238. See id. This case led to the appointment of a special prosecutor to determine
who leaked evidence, a videotape, from a federal grand jury probe of corruption in city
government. The leaker gave a television reporter great visual material for his story.
But protecting the source, probably someone in the Justice Department, did not advance
the investigation itself. Id. at 59-60.
239. See, e.g., Roche v. State, 589 So. 2d 978 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991).
240. See REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, AGENTS OF
DISCOVERY: A REPORT ON THE INCIDENCE OF SUBPOENAS SERVED ON THE NEWS MEDIA IN
2001, at 7 (2003), available at http://rcfp.org/agents/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2006) (finding
that, based on a survey, only three percent of 189 subpoenas issued in connection with
criminal cases were for testimony before grand juries and these did not necessarily seek
government sources).
241. For two reported cases in which reporters resisted requests to testify about their
government sources before grand juries, see People v. Pawlaczyk, 724 N.E.2d 901 (Ill.
2000); Andrews v. Andreoli, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
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hold that Branzburg directly controls these cases and order reporters to
testify.242
Of the cases involving unnamed government sources, a mere handful
dealt with the relation between leaks and governance, and then only
indirectly. At least twice Seymour Hersh’s investigative reporting about
national politics and international affairs prompted demands for his
unnamed government sources.243 In the 1985 prosecution of a Pentagon
employee for selling classified satellite photos to Jane’s Defense Weekly,
the court observed that “[f]requent leaks of the same classified information”
by the government would undermine its assertion that the intelligence
“was closely held or valuable.”244 And many reporters were shocked to
learn in the 1970s that law enforcement officials had been scrutinizing
their long-distance telephone records to uncover government sources
passing along information.245 Courts rejected journalists’ First and
Fourth Amendment challenges to the practice.246
The most direct consideration of leaks in governance came in a brief
opinion by the New Hampshire Supreme Court.247 A 1976 series of
articles based partly on unnamed sources exposed problems in New
Hampshire’s Department of Probation and prompted a legislative
hearing to remove its director.248 When the reporter refused to identify
242. See DIENES, LEVINE & LIND, supra note 3, at 1066-69; Douglas H. Frazer, The
Newsperson’s Privilege in Grand Jury Proceedings: An Argument for Uniform
Recognition and Application, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 413, 415, 419 (1984).
243. Desai v. Hersh, 954 F.2d 1408 (7th Cir. 1992) (seeking the identities of U.S.
government sources, as part of a libel suit, used in a story that a prominent Indian
politician was on the CIA’s payroll and funneled intelligence to the Nixon White
House); In re Disclosure of Grand Jury Report, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1161 (S.D. Fla.
1977) (seeking Hersh’s Justice Department source who leaked a sealed grand jury report
probing allegations that the IRS abused its powers to gather tax information about
individuals).
244. United States v. Morison, 18 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 1417, 1418 (D.
Md. 1985). Morison argued that much of the supposedly confidential information he
was accused of selling to Jane’s had already been leaked to the press when it suited the
government’s interests. Morison sought testimony from three journalists who would
buttress this assertion, and the court recognized its relevance. The court declined,
however, to compel this testimony if the journalists invoked a reporter-source privilege,
which would preclude a thorough cross-examination. In the end, one journalist did
testify because he did not need to claim a testimonial privilege. Id. at 1418-19.
245. Reporters Comm. v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 593 F.2d 1030, 1038-40 nn.17-19 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979) (providing examples of how phone records
were used in efforts to uncover reporters’ sources).
246. Id.
247. Opinion of the Justices, 373 A.2d 644 (N.H. 1977).
248. Id. at 645.
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his sources in the department, the legislature asked the state supreme
court for an advisory opinion about its authority to compel testimony.249
Noting that the state had no shield law, the court weighed the Branzburg
holding and the common law status of a journalist’s privilege.250 In the
end, it concluded that the state “constitution quite consciously ties a free
press to a free state, for effective self-government cannot succeed unless
the people have access to an unimpeded and uncensored flow of
reporting. News gathering is an integral part of the process.”251 The
court linked the success of such reporting to journalists’ ability to protect
the identity of their sources.252
D. The 2004-2005 CIA Leak Case
More than thirty years after Branzburg, the federal courts finally
grappled with a case directly pitting the ethos of leaks from government
sources against the law of journalists’ confidentiality. The conflict
between journalistic and judicial conventions grew from a July 2003 oped column in the New York Times contributed by former Ambassador
Joseph Wilson.253 He had been dispatched to Niger by the CIA in 2002
to investigate rumors that Iraq was attempting to acquire materials for
nuclear weapons.254 In his column, Wilson charged that the White
House had twisted intelligence about Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, a
claim featured in the President’s State of the Union address to justify the
2003 invasion.255 One week after the column appeared, conservative
columnist Robert Novak wrote that “two senior administration officials”
told him that Wilson’s wife, CIA operative Valerie Plame, had arranged
her husband’s Niger probe.256 Similar articles, also citing unnamed
administration officials, appeared in national media over the next days,
and some noted that Plame had worked as a covert CIA operative.257
Observers surmised that Bush administration sources had leaked the
details about Plame’s CIA role to undercut her husband’s credibility as a
critic of the Iraq war.258
249. Id.
250. Id. at 646-47.
251. Id. at 647.
252. Id.
253. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 965-66 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
254. Id. at 966.
255. Id. at 965-66.
256. Id. at 966 (quoting Robert Novak, The Mission to Niger, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July
14, 2003, at 31).
257. Id. (citing Mike Allen & Dana Priest, Bush Administration is Focus of Inquiry;
CIA Agent’s Identity was Leaked to Media, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2003, at 1).
258. Id.; see also supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
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The CIA initiated a legal inquiry by asking the Department of Justice
to find the leakers for possible prosecution under a 1972 law that
prohibited government employees with access to classified information
from publicly identifying covert intelligence agents.259 At first, the
administration insisted that the Department of Justice could conduct the
leak probe without a conflict of interest, but Attorney General John
Ashcroft eventually recused himself, leading to the appointment of U.S.
Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald as special counsel.260
At Fitzgerald’s behest, a grand jury subpoenaed a number of journalists,
most of whom refused to testify because they had promised to protect
their sources’ confidentiality.261 Fitzgerald tried to avoid a direct legal
confrontation with the journalists by securing written statements from a
number of administration officials who were likely sources of the leak,
releasing reporters from honoring their promises.262 Regarding these
waivers as coerced, some reporters continued to rebuff requests for their
testimony and were cited for contempt.263 In the end, reporter Judith
Miller of the New York Times served eighty-five days in jail.264 She
eventually identified her source, the Vice President’s Chief of Staff
Lewis “Scooter” Libby, after he sent Miller a personal note freeing her
from her promise.265
The Special Counsel’s attempts to uncover the journalists’ sources
produced the most searching, though still inadequate, judicial consideration
of leaks as a distinct type of confidentiality case. The press nevertheless
lost each round in court. In reviewing the contempt citations of Miller
and Time magazine reporter Matthew Cooper, the court of appeals
rejected the appellants’ efforts to distinguish their situations from those
presented in Branzburg.266 The press argued that Branzburg dealt only
259. Miller, 397 F.3d at 966 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 421).
260. Id.; see Michael Duffy, Leaking with a Vengeance, TIME, Oct. 13, 2003, at 29,
33-34; Timothy M. Phelps, My Plame Problem—and Yours, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
Jan./Feb. 2006, at 22, 23.
261. Miller, 397 F.3d at 966-68.
262. Id. at 999-1000 (Tatel, J., concurring); see also Phelps, supra note 260, at 2324 (discussing Fitzgerald’s use of waivers to secure the reporters’ cooperation).
263. In re Special Counsel Investigation, 374 F. Supp. 2d 238 (D.D.C. 2005); In re
Special Counsel Investigation, 332 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2004).
264. See Johnston & Stevenson, Times Reporter Gives Testimony, supra note 7.
265. See id. Partly on the basis of Miller’s testimony, Libby was indicted for lying
to the grand jury about his role in the leak. David Johnston & Richard W. Stevenson,
Cheney Aide Charged with Lying in Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, at A1.
266. Miller, 397 F.3d at 969 (“[T]here is no material factual distinction between the
petitions before the Supreme Court in Branzburg and the appeals before us today.”).
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with reporters witnessing crimes, but the court concluded otherwise.
First, it held that the Supreme Court’s decision included references to
confidential sources.267 Second, it decided that Miller and Cooper had
indeed witnessed a crime by receiving “information concerning the
identity of a covert operative of the United States from government
employees . . . .”268 The court also forcefully rejected the claim that
Justice Powell’s concurrence somehow converted Branzburg, which
rejected a journalist’s First Amendment right not to testify, into a
holding that recognized it.269 The court concluded that Powell “only
emphasized that there would be First Amendment protection in cases of
bad faith investigations.”270
The appellants’ secondary arguments also failed to persuade the court
to vacate the contempt citations. Although the judges disagreed about
the existence of a federal common law evidentiary privilege for
journalists, “all believe that if there is any such privilege, it is not
absolute.”271 Even if they recognized a qualified privilege, “it has been
overcome” here.272 The court also held that the “Special Counsel’s secret
evidentiary submissions in support of the enforcement of the subpoenas”
did not violate the appellants’ due process rights.273 Finally, the court
ruled that the Department of Justice’s guidelines for issuing subpoenas
to the news media did not create a legally enforceable right and “merely
guide[d] the discretion of the prosecutors.”274
Although Judge David S. Tatel concurred in the outcome, he exhibited
considerable sympathy for protecting the confidentiality of some
journalistic informants in an opinion that grappled with leaks and their
role in governance.275 Tatel argued that Branzburg might offer modest
support for journalistic confidentiality in some grand jury contexts.276 In
this case, however, he concluded that the claim “for a constitutional
privilege appears weak indeed with respect to leaks” because the
reporter’s testimony would probably be the only way to prove a crime
when the offense was the disclosure itself.277
Looking to the common law, however, Judge Tatel noted that Federal
Rule of Evidence 501, enacted by Congress three years after Branzburg,
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
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gives courts latitude to fashion an evidentiary privilege for journalists.278
“[G]iven the many leaks that no doubt occur in this city [Washington]
every day, it would be naïve to suppose that it will be the last. For the
sake of reporters and sources whom such litigation may ensnare, we
should take this opportunity to clarify their relationship.”279 Reporters
rely on confidences as do doctors, lawyers, and even psychotherapists,
Tatel observed, and thus should be able to protect confidentiality in
some circumstances.280 Otherwise, “[r]eporters could reprint government
statements, but not ferret out underlying disagreements among officials;
they could cover public governmental actions, but would have great
difficulty getting potential whistleblowers to talk about government
misdeeds. . . .”281 Tatel pointed to state shield laws and the Justice
Department’s subpoena guidelines as providing both a rationale for a
federal common law privilege as well as “a strong indication that leakers
demand such protection.”282
Tatel’s opinion appreciates some of the nuances that distinguish leak
cases from other legal disputes over journalists’ confidentiality: “Because
leak cases typically require the government to investigate itself, if leaks
reveal mistakes that high-level officials would have preferred to keep
secret, the administration may pursue the source with excessive zeal,
regardless of the leaked information’s public value.”283 Thus, “the
dynamics of leak inquiries afford a particularly compelling reason for
judicial scrutiny of prosecutorial judgments regarding a leak’s harm and
news value.”284 Furthermore, the privilege, if one exists, belongs here to
the reporter to “safeguard[] public dissemination of information.”285 In
contrast, traditional evidentiary privileges enable sources to block the
disclosure of information.286 This distinction becomes pivotal when
278. Id. at 988-89 (“[A]uthorizing federal courts to develop evidentiary privileges
in federal question cases according to ‘the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted . . . in the light of reason and experience.’ FED. R. EVID. 501.”). Congress
enacted this rule in Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1933 (1975).
279. Miller, 397 F.3d at 990.
280. Id. at 989-93 (arguing that an evidentiary privilege for reporters would serve
the public interest as much as the privilege for psychotherapists recognized by the Court
in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996)).
281. Id. at 991.
282. Id. at 993.
283. Id. at 998-99.
284. Id. at 998.
285. Id. at 1000.
286. Id. at 999-1000.
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prosecutors secure waivers from the government sources who may have
leaked, as the Special Counsel did, “[A] source’s waiver is irrelevant to
the reasons for the privilege.”287
Though he rejected absolute protection for journalists, Tatel would
apply a variant of the customary three-prong qualified privilege. He
acknowledges that in leak cases the first two elements—need and
exhaustion—“will almost always be satisfied, leaving the reporter’s
source unprotected . . . .”288 Tatel’s common law privilege therefore relies
heavily on a balancing test for its third element: “Specifically, the court
must weigh the public interest in compelling disclosure, measured by the
harm the leak caused, against the public interest in newsgathering,
measured by the leaked information’s value.”289 Applying his balancing
test to the CIA leak case, Judge Tatel concluded that “no privilege bars
the subpoenas.”290 He believed that the possible harm caused by leaking
the name of a covert CIA operative outweighed its informational value
to the public.291 In reaching this conclusion, Tatel noted that Congress
had criminalized such disclosures because earlier leaks had possibly led
to the death of intelligence agents.292 The balance also tipped in favor of
compelling disclosure because of the “sinister motive” behind the leaks
to punish an administration critic.293 “[D]iscouraging leaks of this kind
is precisely what the public interest requires.”294
IV. TWO PERSPECTIVES ON THE ROLE OF LEAKS IN GOVERNANCE
A thorough understanding of the varied purposes behind leaks in
modern political communication should guide any effort to realign
confidentiality law.295 Most scholars, along with journalists, regard
leaks as primarily a form of news management by sources for political
gain.296 This perspective, though undeniably important, has overshadowed
287. Id. at 1000. The release may also have been secured through coercion.
288. Id. at 997.
289. Id. at 998.
290. Id. at 1003.
291. Id. at 1001-04.
292. Id. at 996.
293. Id. at 1003.
294. Id.
295. To explicate the modern use of leaks, this Part draws on examples from World
War II, where Part II left off, through the Clinton administration. By ending in 2000,
this Article attempts to sketch enduring patterns in the media’s use of unnamed government
sources without getting embroiled in the partisan disputes surrounding recent leaks and
the litigation they spawned.
296. For studies of the Washington press corps that treat leaks mainly as a form of
political maneuvering, see DOUGLASS CATER, THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT
128-41 (1959); RITCHIE, supra note 129, at xiii-xiv, 141, 227-34; WILLIAM L. RIVERS,
THE OPINIONMAKERS passim g(1965); ROSTEN, supra note 102, at 82; LEON V. SIGAL,
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another view that sees leaks as a form of communication within and
between organizations. In this view, the anonymous disclosure of
information through the mass media supplements the transmission of
messages sent along the formal channels of intra and intergovernmental
communication.297 These complementary perspectives highlight the
varied functions of leaks in modern governance.
A. Leaks for Political and Policy Purposes
With power in the federal government widely dispersed and partly
derived from public opinion, officials maneuver to shape the news that
surrounds policymaking as well as that which affects their own political
standing or that of their allies and enemies. Government officials and
politicians tailor leaks to serve these ends. Leaks have considerable
utility in launching and advancing policies as well as crippling them, in
enhancing the political status of the leaker and the leaker’s patron or in
undercutting enemies, and in cultivating favorable relations with reporters
for long-term gain. Of course, a single leak can serve multiple purposes.
1. Leaks to Influence Policy
Sources use leaks for two basic policymaking maneuvers—to promote
and undermine plans—and for a number of subsidiary reasons. Officials
turn to leaks when they want to test policy options, warm up public and
REPORTERS AND OFFICIALS: THE ORGANIZATION AND POLITICS OF NEWSMAKING 131-50
(1973). Similarly, journalists reflecting on the role of leaked information also typically
view the practice as a political maneuver. See, e.g., Thomas Griffith, Just Don’t Quote
Me, TIME, Dec. 10, 1979, at 126; Thomas Griffith, A Sinking Feeling About Leaks, TIME,
Dec. 22, 1980, at 81; Richard Halloran, A Primer on the Fine Art of Leaking
Information, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1983, at A16; Mark Hosenball, Leak-a-Boo: A
Washington (Dis)information Guide, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 12, 1987 at 23; Howard Kurtz,
How Sources and Reporters Play the Game of Leaks, WASH. POST NAT’L WKLY. ED.,
Mar. 15-21, 1993, at 25; Flora Lewis, Leaks and Stories, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1982, at
E23; Tom Wicker, Leak On, O Ship of State!, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1982, at A15; see
also STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 88TH CONG., GOVERNMENT
NEWS FROM ANONYMOUS SOURCES (Comm. Print 1964) (discussing leaks as both
political maneuvers and as efforts by government to communicate with domestic and
foreign audiences); Dahlan, supra note 1, at 2-5, 19-38 (reviewing the pre-1967 literature
on leaks).
On leaks as political maneuvering in Britain, see MICHAEL COCKERELL, PETER
HENNESSY & DAVID WALKER, SOURCES CLOSE TO THE PRIME MINISTER 31-33, 45, 128,
130-35, 139, 183-84, 234 (1984); BERNARD INGHAM, THE WAGES OF SPIN 88-89, 94,
110-11, 134, 187-88 (2003).
297. See Dahlan, supra note 1; infra Part IV.B.
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congressional opinion, influence the context of deliberations, and more.
Officials seeking the widest publicity often leak to the New York Times
and Washington Post to reach these publications’ influential readers as
well as to “set the agenda” for broadcast news programs with more
general audiences later in the day.298
One of the most venerable types of leaks, a trial balloon, allows a
source to gauge the reaction of key agencies, clientele organizations, or
the public before openly embracing a policy.299 White House initiatives
to overhaul health care, Social Security, or tax policy are typically
preceded by leaks to assess the probable fate of various options.300
Administrations also test the viability of potential nominees for important
positions by floating trial balloons.301 The White House sometimes conducts
polls after it leaks a policy option to formally gauge the public’s
response.302 Although used mainly in connection with domestic policy,
trial balloons can also help the White House predict international
response to a foreign policy or military initiative.303 The chief advantage
of trial balloons, of course, is that sources simply deny that they ever
formally embraced a proposal whose prospects appear bleak after the
leak, thereby saving both face and political capital.304
298. MARK HERTSGAARD, ON BENDED KNEE: THE PRESS AND THE REAGAN
PRESIDENCY 122-23 (1988) (noting that the White House routinely leaked to the Times
and Post “overnight, which set the agenda for the next day’s TV stories,” according to
United Press International correspondent James Anderson).
299. For early twentieth-century examples, see supra notes 109-11 and accompanying
text.
300. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Health Aides See a Tax on Benefits Beyond Basic Plan,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1993, at A1 (discussing how the Clinton administration used leaks
as it developed proposals for national health care policy). When the Clinton
administration was segueing from the trial balloon leak stage to promoting specific
policies, “several journalists . . . pleaded with them [senior administration officials] to
permit disclosure of their names.” A White House spokesman refused: “We want to
explain and communicate our policies to the American people, and we think background
discussions are a good way of doing it.” Id. at A38; see also Keith Erickson, Presidential
Leaks: Rhetoric and Mediated Political Knowledge, 56 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 199, 202
(1989) (discussing Ford and Carter administration leaks about possible new taxes on
gasoline that were abandoned because of the negative public response).
301. See, e.g., Griffith, A Sinking Feeling, supra note 296, at 81 (discussing
negative congressional response to Reagan administration trial balloons about possible
cabinet nominees).
302. See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 300, at 202 (discussing the Carter administration’s
polling of national and international opinion about a boycott of the 1980 Olympics then
under consideration and floated via a trial balloon).
303. See, e.g., BRUCE LADD, CRISIS IN CREDIBILITY 113 (1968) (discussing President
Johnson’s trial balloon to gauge international reaction, especially that of the Soviet
Union, to the contemplated bombing of Haiphong harbor in North Vietnam).
304. Douglass Cater provides a good example of how trial balloons allow sources to
tell seemingly contradictory public and private stories and yet just manage to remain
truthful. In 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles talked to reporters, on the
condition that they not use his name, about a possible Korean boundary settlement. The
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A well-designed trial balloon can do more than simply gauge reaction
to a tentative policy. Trial balloons can pave the way for negotiations
between the White House and Congress, as when President Ronald
Reagan signaled through a leak his willingness to reduce the 1983
military budget if lawmakers cut social programs.305 In the hands of a
master manipulator like President Lyndon Johnson, a trial balloon
became a political feint. On one occasion he directed an aide to plant a
story about a possible administration move to cut support for domestic
rice growers.306 Johnson had no such plans, but the leaked story
prompted the desired response: rice growers and lawmakers from
affected districts met with Johnson to plead for their program.307 The
President offered to drop the nonexistent plan in return for their support
on other matters.308 Another variation on trial balloons involves leaking
several policy options, including highly unpopular ones, to ease the
public into accepting a distasteful course of action.309
Beyond testing policy options, a promotional leak discloses information
that advances a policy favored by the source. Because most promotional
leaks spring from institutions’ upper echelons, one veteran Washington
reporter famously observed that the ship of state is the only vessel that
leaks mainly at the top.310 President Kennedy’s press secretary concurred,
noting that a leak “generally occurs when Presidents and governments
hostile reaction on Capitol Hill prompted the White House to issue a “denial, drafted by
none other than Dulles himself, which stated that ‘the Administration has never reached
any conclusion that a permanent division of Korea is desirable or feasible . . . .’” CATER,
supra note 296, at 136-37. The operative phrase, “never reached any conclusion,” while
literally true, “was not, in fact, what it seemed—a clear repudiation of what Mr. Dulles
told the reporters and what they wrote, perforce on their own authority, for their papers.”
Id. at 137.
305. See Erickson, supra note 300, at 201. Erickson notes that “presidential leaks
rhetorically accom[m]odate congressional decision-making by signaling negotiable
positions, impending decisions, and presidential ‘leanings.’” Id. at 211.
306. MICHAEL B. GROSSMAN & MARTHA J. KUMAR, PORTRAYING THE PRESIDENT:
THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE NEWS MEDIA 175-76 (1981).
307. Id. at 175.
308. Id. at 175-76.
309. See, e.g., LADD, supra note 303, at 108-09 (discussing how the Johnson
administration used a trial balloon-like leak to “psychologically prepar[e] the public to
accept” more troops in Vietnam).
310. JAMES RESTON, THE ARTILLERY OF THE PRESS: ITS INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 66 (1967); Griffith, A Sinking Feeling, supra note 296, at 81; see also
WILLIAM MCGAFFIN & ERWIN KNOLL, ANYTHING BUT THE TRUTH: THE CREDIBILITY
GAP—HOW THE NEWS IS MANAGED IN WASHINGTON 106-23 (1968) (discussing leaks,
many competing with each other, from the White House, leading members of Congress,
and agency heads during the 1950s and 1960s).
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wish to advance a certain viewpoint and pass to newspaper men
documents or information of a confidential nature which would advance
this point of view.”311 Such leaks allow newsmakers “to orchestrate
coverage from behind a curtain of anonymity.”312 They can be deployed
in combination with any of about twenty other techniques, most overt,
that agencies use to cultivate a favorable information environment
surrounding a policy.313 Thus, Presidents have leaked classified data
about Soviet military strength, satellite photos, and less sensitive
information to advance their policies.314 Alexander Haig, Secretary of
State during the Reagan administration, noted that despite the problems
caused by some leaks, “in the end I concluded that they were a way of
governing. Leaks constituted policy; they were the authentic voice of
the government.”315
Crippling leaks, in contrast to promotional leaks, disclose information
that undermines a policy or counters an agency’s intended action. They
often provide insights into the policymaking process and prompt rebukes
from agencies trying to keep their deliberations secret. Crippling leaks
stem from interagency rivalries, disagreements between the executive
and legislative branches, and tension between political appointees and
the civil servants they direct.316 For instance, one military service might
311. Memo from Pierre Salinger to Theodore Sorenson, quoted in GROSSMAN &
KUMAR, supra note 306, at 282.
312. Kurtz, supra note 296, at 25.
313. Id. A source’s tools for shaping a favorable information environment include
communication plans, press conferences, op-ed contributions, official reports, staged
events, media tours, arrangements for traveling media, news features, background
briefings, video news releases, print public relations, meetings with columnists, meetings
with editorial boards, meetings with reporters, press guidances, press briefing books,
polls, and multiple uses of the Internet. Patrick O’Heffernan, Mass Media and U.S.
Foreign Policy: A Mutual Exploitation Model of Media Influence in U.S. Foreign Policy,
in MEDIA AND PUBLIC POLICY 187, 198-99 (Robert J. Spitzer ed., 1993).
314. See, e.g., DAVID WISE, THE POLITICS OF LYING: GOVERNMENT DECEPTION,
SECRECY, AND POWER 104-05, 108-09 (1973) (discussing leaks by the administration of
classified information, including details of Soviet military strength, whose release was
designed to pressure Congress to accept the President’s budget); Hosenball, supra note
296, at 24 (discussing the leak of satellite photos supposedly supporting administration
claims of Soviet assistance for communists in Latin America).
315. ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR., CAVEAT: REALISM, REAGAN, AND FOREIGN POLICY
17 (1984).
316. See, e.g., HUGH HECLO, A GOVERNMENT OF STRANGERS: EXECUTIVE POLITICS
IN WASHINGTON (1977) (discussing power relationships between a department’s political
leaders and its top bureaucrats); JOHN B. MEDARIS WITH ARTHUR GORDON, COUNTDOWN
FOR DECISION 244-47 (1960) (discussing the Army’s use of leaks to elicit support from
Congress in opposing a shift of resources to NASA); ROGER HILSMAN, TO MOVE A
NATION: THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY
71 (1967) (discussing a leak designed to get Congress to block the transfer of some
duties from the State Department to the CIA even though State was willing to relinquish
them). On leaks from Congress and the Pentagon intended to undermine administration
plans to increase troop deployments in Vietnam, see MARVIN KALB & ELIE ABEL, ROOTS
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leak information disparaging another service’s proposed weapons system
so that its competing system is approved.317 In one Machiavellian maneuver
involving all three services, the Army leaked to the press an Air Force
staff paper that deprecated the Navy’s newest aircraft carriers.318 Some
crippling leaks involve international ploys. American officials displeased
with changes in foreign policy can leak information to the press that
brings pressure from overseas to bear inside the Capital Beltway.319
Because leaks can undermine administration initiatives, officials in the
executive branch worry about them more than members of Congress and
sporadically order investigations to ferret out the sources.320
Sources also wield leaks for more subtle tactical purposes than simply
supporting or opposing a policy. Officials in a position to manufacture
news, such as the President, can leak an important story to overshadow
the newsmaking efforts of a rival,321 or to save face by circulating
explanations for unpalatable decisions.322 Sources use leaks to affect the
policymaking process by speeding up or delaying deliberations.323 Sources
OF INVOLVEMENT:

THE U.S. IN ASIA, 1784-1971, 238 (1971); WISE, supra note 314, at
283-84.
317. See, e.g., JAMES BAAR & WILLIAM HOWARD, POLARIS! 215-16 (1960); WALTER
MILLIS, ARMS AND THE STATE: CIVIL-MILITARY ELEMENTS IN NATIONAL POLICY 241-42
(1958); JACK RAYMOND, POWER AT THE PENTAGON 198-201 (1964).
318. By making it appear as though the Air Force was undermining the Navy, the
Army drove a wedge between the two services and strengthened its own position.
MICHAEL H. ARMACOST, THE POLITICS OF WEAPONS INNOVATION: THE THOR-JUPITER
CONTROVERSY 93 n.31 (1969).
319. See, e.g., SIGAL, supra note 296, at 142 (discussing an Air Force leak to arouse
European opposition to American plans for changes in NATO); MAXWELL D. TAYLOR,
THE UNCERTAIN TRUMPET 41-42 (1959) (discussing how a leak about U.S. plans to
withdraw troops elicited enough international opposition to thwart the plan).
320. See MARTIN LINSKY, IMPACT: HOW THE PRESS AFFECTS FEDERAL
POLICYMAKING 136 (1986); see also infra note 431 (reviewing leak investigations under
several Presidents).
321. See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 300, at 202 (discussing several Presidents’ leaks
of upbeat news to drown out bad).
322. See, e.g., JEB STUART MAGRUDER, AN AMERICAN LIFE: ONE MAN’S ROAD TO
WATERGATE 200 (1974) (explaining how the Nixon White House leaked a cover story to
account for shifting the Republican national convention out of San Diego).
323. See, e.g., LINSKY, supra note 320, at 80, 185 (providing examples of how leaks
accelerated action by officials and also were used, unsuccessfully, to forestall action).
More generally, Linsky’s survey of officials found that leaks may influence the
policymaking process as much as the output. “Policymakers expect leaks, anticipate
their impact, take preventative measures, and use them strategically themselves.” Id. at
188. To minimize the possibility of leaks, policymakers narrow the range of policy
options they consider, limit the number of people involved in decisionmaking, and put
less information in writing. Id.
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also leak stories to control the timing and context of making news
public. To mitigate the damage from negative stories that CBS was
about to air, the Clinton White House leaked the same information to
newspapers shortly before the broadcast, thus determining the timing
and avoiding the “hyperventilated” and “accusatory” tone of much
television news.324
2. Leaks to Shape Personal Images
Policy considerations figure in nearly all leaks, but some are
motivated primarily by a desire to influence a person’s political standing
positively or negatively, and only indirectly to influence deliberations.
Officials can burnish their own or an ally’s image through leaked stories.
President Kennedy, for instance, cooperated with journalists writing a
behind-the-scenes account of the decisionmaking during the Cuban
Missile Crisis.325 The article underscored Kennedy’s resolve in confronting
the Soviet Union, a portrayal that immediately boosted his standing with
the public and left a record that influenced historians’ interpretations.326
In a so-called “reverse blame leak,” stories about Secretary of State
Alexander Haig reported undiplomatic remarks he had made about world
leaders at a staff meeting.327 Although the leak ostensibly appeared to harm
Haig, in fact it repaired his image of “not being tough enough for the
job” by presenting him as “a confident and independent official with his
own point of view.”328 As Vice President, Nixon used leaks to distance
himself from positions held by President Dwight Eisenhower.329
Sources involved in intra-administration personal rivalries and especially
those behind salacious attacks on opponents find it imperative to
324. HOWARD KURTZ, SPIN CYCLE: INSIDE THE CLINTON PROPAGANDA MACHINE 4244 (1998).
325. See DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST 28 (1972); see also
ELIE ABEL, LEAKING: WHO DOES IT? WHO BENEFITS? AT WHAT COST? 33-34 (1987)
(discussing carefully crafted leaks by the White House that gave the New York Times
direct quotes from Kennedy’s exchanges with the Soviet foreign minister showing the
President’s resolve).
326. Id.
327. LINSKY, supra note 320, at 195.
328. Id. HECLO, supra note 316, at 226 n.11, recounts a daring reverse leak:
While jockeying with another staff member, the [Presidential] assistant leaked
a disclosure of his own impending removal from the West Wing. The
opponent, who obviously stood the most to gain from the story, was naturally
asked to confirm or deny the report. Since he was not yet strong enough to
accomplish such a removal, the opponent had to deny responsibility for the
leak and its accuracy, thereby inadvertently strengthening the position of the
presidential assistant who first leaked the story.
329. See FRANCIS E. ROURKE, SECRECY & PUBLICITY: DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRACY
201 (1961).
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maintain anonymity as they use the news media to fight their battles.
Under Lyndon Johnson, the White House leaked information about
sexual escapades of both Democrats and Republicans.330 In the Nixon
White House, the “plumbers” unit leaked information about those on its
enemies list, including a photograph of Edward Kennedy in Rome
standing next to an attractive woman; the National Enquirer and later
Newsweek published it.331 Leaks have been used to undermine rivals
competing for the President’s attention and to shift blame or settle
grudges.332 Nancy Reagan leaked news to a favorite luncheon companion,
columnist George Will, to blame chief of staff Donald Regan for failing
to protect President Reagan in the Iran Contra affair.333 High stakes
political battles, such as Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr’s investigation
of President Clinton, often degenerate into endless dueling leaks filled
with personal information.334 Most recently, the stories at the center of
the CIA leak investigation involved, in part, such hostile leaks.335
3. Leaks to Improve Relations with Reporters
Sources, especially high status ones, employ several means for
ingratiating themselves with reporters, including dispensing leaks.336
330. See Erickson, supra note 300, at 203.
331. See MAGRUDER, supra note 322, at 66-71. The White House plumbers unit
involved in the Watergate break-in was originally set up to plug Pentagon Papers-like
leaks but, ironically, also planted its own stories. It leaked information that attacked
Daniel Ellsberg, who had leaked the Pentagon Papers, and it also mined classified
documents from the Kennedy administration to leak stories that tarnished the former
President’s image. See DANIEL ELLSBERG, SECRETS: A MEMOIR OF VIETNAM AND THE
PENTAGON PAPERS 425-43 (2002). But see WISE, supra note 314, at 278-81 (discussing a
story leaked by the Nixon White House designed to embarrass the chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board that backfired when reporters saw through the ploy).
332. See, e.g., BERNARD C. COHEN, THE PRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY 197 (1963)
(discussing the use of news by two foreign policy officials to promote their competing
approaches to disarmament in the Eisenhower administration); Kurtz, supra note 296, at
25 (providing examples of leaks arising from intra-administration feuds during the
presidency of George H. W. Bush); LINSKY, supra note 320, at 185 (discussing leaks from
the Reagan White House to shift blame for an embarrassing policy).
333. See Joel Connelly, Nancy Reagan Has Risen Above Her Detractors’ Barbs,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 11, 2004, at A2.
334. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
335. See HESS, supra note 1, at 77 (defining the animus leak as one “used to settle
grudges. Information is disclosed to embarrass another person.”).
336. See GROSSMAN & KUMAR, supra note 306, at 283-88 (listing several ways
sources ingratiate themselves with reporters: courting elite journalists, cultivating
friendships, performing direct favors, and throwing them raw meat—that is, giving a
hostile reporter good information).
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The goodwill leak, where a source bestows a “scoop” on a favorite
reporter, earns credit that might later prove valuable.337 “This type of
leak is often on a subject with which the leaker has little or no personal
involvement and happens because most players in governmental
Washington gather a great deal of extraneous information in the course
of their business and social lives.”338 Maintaining good relations with
reporters is probably a “subsidiary motivation” behind most leaks.339
Rewarding reporters with leaked information also enables sources to
divert attention from more sensitive topics.340 For instance, as an avid
leaker, Colonel Oliver North ingratiated himself with reporters, making
them reluctant to vigorously investigate and publicize his role in the
Reagan administration’s covert sale of arms to Iran.341
B. Leaks as Organizational Communication
Besides their role in political maneuvering and policymaking, leaks
facilitate governance by supplementing the formal channels of organizational
and inter-organizational communication.342 From this perspective, leaks
to the press annex the mass media to relay information among government
decisionmakers outside the official communication network.343 The
Reagan administration, for instance, converted the New York Times,
Washington Post, news magazines, and television networks into “White
337. HESS, supra note 1, at 77. WISE, supra note 314, at 328-36, reports how a
small gesture by Lyndon Johnson, bestowing a seemingly minor leak on a new reporter
covering the President, snowballed into a major political event. “Before it was over, the
stock market was shaken, the Federal Reserve Board had raised the discount rate, and the
nation appeared, at least briefly, to be in the grip of a serious economic crisis.” Id. at
328-29.
338. HESS, supra note 1, at 77; see also LINSKY, supra note 320, at 194-95 (providing
examples of information leaked to maintain favorable relations with reporters).
339. SIGAL, supra note 296, at 142.
340. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 332, at 204.
341. See ABEL, supra note 325, at 27.
342. See generally DORIS A. GRABER, PUBLIC SECTOR COMMUNICATION: HOW
ORGANIZATIONS MANAGE INFORMATION (1992) (providing an overview of communication
structures and practices in government agencies). Now-classic works by political
scientists, economists, and organizational behaviorists from the late 1940s through the
1960s moved intra- and inter-organizational communication to center stage in
understanding governmental decisionmaking. See, e.g., KARL W. DEUTSCH, THE NERVES
OF GOVERNMENT: MODELS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND CONTROL (1963); ANTHONY
DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967); RICHARD NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE
POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP (1960); HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A
STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION (2d ed. 1957);
HAROLD L. WILENSKY, ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: KNOWLEDGE AND POLICY IN
GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY (1967).
343. “The news media serve as a network to convey messages through a
governmental system that is extremely decentralized and that has no consistently
effective internal communications system.” GROSSMAN & KUMAR, supra note 306, at 31.
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House bulletin boards,” on which staff posted leaks to communicate
“with other officials and agencies of the U.S. government, and even with
foreign governments.”344 Information leaked to the press thus becomes
available to the public although it is aimed primarily at a narrow,
attentive audience of other decisionmakers. The targeted receivers may
work in the organization from which the leak originated, in other agencies,
or even in other governments. A survey of high-ranking federal officials
confirms that some of their leaks had a major communicative component
distinct from their purposes as policy maneuvers.345
News leaks overcome common failings of organizational communication.
Agency structure can constrain the volume of messages transmitted in
different directions, slow message relay, and distort the message as it is
conveyed from source to receiver.346 Leaks thus supplement inadequate
internal channels, bypass obstacles, and serve as an antidistortion device.
As a type of subformal communication, the messages conveyed by leaks
“can be withdrawn, altered, adjusted, magnified, or canceled without any
official record being made.”347 Additionally, information leaked to the
press can be more persuasive for the recipient than messages sent
through formal channels. Leaked information, however, suffers from its
own communication pitfalls. The press can garble messages much as
agency gatekeepers distort information they relay through channels.
Furthermore, the cryptic nature of news leaks means that some intended
receivers never see the messages and, if they do, they can misinterpret
them or wrongly infer the identity of the source.348
344. HAIG, supra note 315, at 18 (noted by Secretary of State).
345. LINSKY, supra note 320, at 230-39, reports survey results from 483 senior
federal officials who served in executive branch agencies, Congress, and independent
commissions between the Johnson and Reagan administrations. When asked about
leaks, 73% said they had used them to “gain attention for an issue or policy option,”
which could have both a policy and a communicative dimension; 30% “to inform other
officials of a policy consideration or action”; 14% to “reveal your bargaining position on
an issue”; and 32% to “send a message to another branch of government.” Most of the
other reasons for leaking clearly involved policy maneuvers. Id.
346. On organizational structure and impediments to full, accurate information
flows, see DOWNS, supra note 342, at 112-31; GRABER, supra note 342, at 94-101;
EVERETT M. ROGERS & REKHA AGARWALA-ROGERS, COMMUNICATION IN ORGANIZATIONS
77-107 (1976); Frederic M. Jablin, Formal Organization Structure, in HANDBOOK OF
ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION 389 (Frederic M. Jablin et al. eds., 1987); Charles A.
O’Reilly, Jennifer A. Chatman, & John C. Anderson, Message Flow and Decision
Making, in id. at 600.
347. DOWNS, supra note 342, at 113.
348. See Dahlan, supra note 1, at 130-93 (reviewing the problems targets encounter
in deciphering the source and import of leaks, especially foreign governments attempting
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1. Leaks as Upward Communication
Lower-level officials sometimes leak information to the press to
communicate with the upper echelons of their own agency. Leaks of
this type partly redress two problems with upward communication.
Messages in the press stand out from the clutter of routine organizational
intelligence that competes for superiors’ attention, and they also bypass
intermediaries who obstruct the upward flow of embarrassing information.349
“Communicating out of channels” is a common response to the “dilemma
of hierarchy vs. intelligence,” according to a prominent political scientist.350
From reading newspapers, especially the New York Times and Washington
Post, Presidents and agency heads learn of issues bottled up in their
bureaucracies.351 In the Pentagon Papers case, a veteran New York
Times reporter asserted that “[m]iddle-rank officials” routinely leaked
information to “attract the attention of their superiors.”352 Estrangement
between civil service employees and politically appointed agency heads
also breeds leaks as a kind of upward communication.353 Even the
leaders of state agencies learn to scan the press for information about
their own departments.354
The State Department and other bureaucracies in which information
flows from distant outposts through many desks and bureaus are
especially prone to use leaks as a tool for upward communication. “I
found it easier to bring my views to bear on the President of the United
States by way of The Washington Post and its New Delhi correspondent
to infer the meaning of a communication sent via the press); HESS, supra note 1, at 93
(questioning the “utility and rationality of leaks as an intragovernmental means of
communications” because their cryptic nature means that “there are so many different
interpretations of what is being accomplished, by whom, and for what purposes . . . .”).
349. On problems with upward flows in government bureaucracies, see Dahlan,
supra note 1, at 72-73; DOWNS, supra note 342, at 116-18; GRABER, supra note 342, at
95-96, 107-09.
350. WILENSKY, supra note 342, at 46.
351. MORTON H. HALPERIN, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY 173,
179-80 (1974). Halperin notes that a President’s aides scan the media for leaked stories
in the days before a press conference because these are likely subjects for questions.
“Thus an official anxious to bring an issue to the attention of the President may plant a
story with the expectation that the subject will then come up in the preparation for the
press conference.” Id. at 180; see also Carol H. Weiss, What America’s Leaders Read,
38 PUB. OPINION Q. 1 (1974) (discussing the importance of the New York Times and
Washington Post as news sources for federal officials).
352. SANFORD J. UNGAR, THE PAPERS AND THE PAPERS 167 (1972) (quoting New
York Times Washington bureau chief Max Frankel); see also Dahlan, supra note 1, at 75
(noting that leaks sometimes attract more attention than official announcements);
MEDARIS, supra note 316, at 246 (noting a leak designed to inform the President of
disagreements among lower level bureaucrats).
353. See HECLO, supra note 316, at 208-09.
354. DELMER D. DUNN, PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE PRESS 102-03 (1969).
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than by way of the State Department,” an ambassador to India once
asserted.355 Similarly, U.S. officials in Saigon during the early days of the
Vietnam War discovered that some of their assessments of the situation
were more likely to be noticed in Washington if published in influential
newspapers than if communicated through institutional channels.356
Upward leaks have considerable utility even in a flat bureaucracy such
as Congress. Congressional aides with easy access to members of
Congress leak information to attract their bosses’ attention because
memoranda might literally lie buried in a stack of documents or at best
compete for attention with other pressing issues.357
Whistleblowers who leak information to the press sometimes turn to
the media only after obstacles in an agency’s internal communication
system prevent them from informing superiors about problems. In such
cases, leaks surmount organizational hurdles.358 The unauthorized release
of the Pentagon Papers and Deep Throat’s leaks to the Washington Post
both raised concerns that had not been successfully addressed through
official channels.359 In the Pentagon Papers case, Daniel Ellsberg first
attempted to communicate his findings to government officials; he
leaked to the press only when members of Congress hesitated to act.360
As Deep Throat, FBI Deputy Director Felt leaked information about
Watergate to the Washington Post because his immediate superior, the
acting director of the agency, had just been appointed by Nixon and was

355. SIGAL, supra note 296, at 135 (quoting Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith’s
affidavit filed in the Pentagon Papers case, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)).
356. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 332, at 243 (discussing State Department leaks of
information that sources hesitated to send through formal channels); HILSMAN, supra
note 316, at 499 (discussing maneuvers to get competing assessments of the situation in
Vietnam noticed in Washington); JOHN MECKLIN, MISSION IN TORMENT: AN INTIMATE
ACCOUNT OF THE U.S. ROLE IN VIETNAM 223 (1965) (discussing Ambassador Henry
Cabot Lodge’s use of leaks to attract attention from Saigon).
357. Susan H. Miller, Reporters and Congress: Living in Symbiosis, JOURNALISM
MONOGRAPHS, No. 53, at 4 (1978).
358. See Lea P. Stewart, “Whistle Blowing”: Implications for Organizational
Communication, 30 J. COMM. 90 (1980); see also MYRON P. GLAZER & PENINA M.
GLAZER, THE WHISTLEBLOWERS: EXPOSING CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY
48-50, 167-77 (1989) (discussing whistleblowing generally and with some attention to
the role of the press); Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: A
False Hope for Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 355 (1991) (reviewing the role of
government whistleblowers and noting the shortcomings of statutory protections).
359. These two examples also have elements of crippling leaks, discussed supra
text accompanying notes 316-20.
360. ELLSBERG, supra note 331, at 181-83, 323-29, 356-64.

479

KIELBOWICZ.POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC

11/9/2006 2:33 PM

obstructing the investigation.361 He even went as far as burning some of
the suspects’ documents.362 Although whistleblowing leaks rarely
approach the significance of Deep Throat’s, such communications by
unidentified news sources remain a valuable safety valve in our system
of government.
2. Leaks as Downward Communication
At first glance, Presidents and agency heads would seem unlikely to
leak information to the press to communicate with their subordinates.
But even when ample channels exist for downward communication,
leaks can be useful in conveying information.363 Leaks to the press
percolate quickly to the lower levels of a large bureaucracy and capture
subordinates’ attention. Information that “appears to have been pried
loose rather than officially communicated” is more salient to staff.364
Sitting atop a huge bureaucracy, Presidents have found leaks to the
press a useful mechanism for communicating their wishes to those who
formulate and implement policy.365 For example, when Lyndon Johnson
wanted the State Department to tone down its efforts to promote a
multilateral force (MLF), he drafted a memo for internal circulation and
leaked the story to the New York Times.366 “Unlike an internal
memorandum with limited circulation inside the executive branch, a
press clipping could be cited as proof of the President’s wishes by
opponents of the MLF on both sides of the Potomac and the Atlantic.”367
A leak signaling the President’s (or other executive’s) preference serves
as a “hunting license” to subordinates who share the same goals.368
Leaks can also direct subordinates to ignore public pronouncements. A
President who strikes a public posture to appease some interest group
can, via a leak, signal the bureaucracy to discount the public statement.369
Distasteful or delicate decisions, such as the need for a Presidential aide
to resign, can also be communicated through leaks.370
361. See O’Connor, supra note 11, at 129, 131.
362. Id.; see also WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 96-97.
363. See GRABER, supra note 342, at 101-05 (discussing the impediments to
successful downward communication in organizations).
364. GROSSMAN & KUMAR, supra note 306, at 31.
365. HALPERIN, supra note 351, at 286.
366. Id.
367. SIGAL, supra note 296, at 136-37; see also PHILIP GEYELIN, LYNDON B.
JOHNSON AND THE WORLD 174-76 (1966).
368. HALPERIN, supra note 351, at 180.
369. GROSSMAN & KUMAR, supra note 306, at 31.
370. For example, Eisenhower’s chief of staff, Sherman Adams, embarrassed the
administration by taking gifts from a Boston industrialist in return for influencing
regulatory proceedings. To hasten Adams’ departure without forcing a public confrontation,
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3. Leaks as Horizontal Communication Within and
Between Governments
Bureaucrats use leaks to convey information to other departments of
their own agency, to other agencies, to another branch of government,
and even to foreign governments. In a sense, all such messages are
horizontal intra- or inter-organizational communication.
When leaks convey information between units of government, they
partly bridge communication gaps created by the separation of powers.
Scholars of organizational behavior term this “boundary spanning.”371
Such messages short circuit, usually in a positive way, the tortuous path
messages follow if transmitted through the chain of command of two or
more agencies.372 The media “serve as a means of supplementing the
internal lines of communication of the sprawling federal establishment.”373
Members of Congress, for example, have few opportunities to question
the President directly and must rely upon reports in the press, many based
on leaks, to obtain clues about the White House position on some matters.374
The dispersion of power within legislative bodies creates many centers
of decisionmaking with imperfect channels for exchanging information.
A study of Wisconsin government found that “legislative leaders, more
than other officials, rely on newspapers for intra-organizational
information.”375 Likewise, the communication channels in Congress
provide only limited information exchange between the two chambers.376
the President authorized a leak that Adams’ days in the White House were numbered.
See id. at 172-73.
371. See GRABER, supra note 342, at 106-07, 189-97, 247 (discussing horizontal
communication within agencies and communication that spans organizational
boundaries). Structural problems government agencies face in spanning organizational
boundaries create an especially important role for the press in supplementing formal
communication channels, Graber notes. Id. at 196-97.
372. For a mid-level official to communicate with a counterpart in another agency
through the formal chain of command, a message must be relayed upward to the first’s
superior, laterally to the second’s superior, and finally downward to the receiver. Not
only does this delay receipt, but it also increases the chances for message distortion
during transmission. See DOWNS, supra note 342, at 115-27. Of course, a number of
strategies other than leaking information to the press can be used to bypass
intermediaries.
373. V. O. KEY, JR., PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 405 (1963).
374. DOUGLASS CATER, POWER IN WASHINGTON: A CRITICAL LOOK AT TODAY’S
STRUGGLE TO GOVERN IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL 14 (1964).
375. DUNN, supra note 354, at 112 (emphasis omitted).
376. Harrison W. Fox, Jr. & Susan W. Jammond, The Growth of Congressional
Staffs, in CONGRESS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT 112, 120-23 (Harvey C. Mansfield, Sr., ed.,
1975).

481

KIELBOWICZ.POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC

11/9/2006 2:33 PM

Senators and Representatives thus keep abreast of developments in their
own institution partly by following news reports.377
Leaks have proven so useful in communicating between governments
that the diplomatic establishment recognizes several subtypes, including
leaks to signal or clarify intentions, induce discussions, and alter the
course of negotiations.378 Although governments have formal means of
communicating with each other, relaying messages anonymously through
the media enjoys several advantages. The media can transmit information
outside the often rigid international bureaucracies faster and more
efficiently, and news in high-status publications commands the respect
of diplomats.379 Furthermore, news accounts can signal a government’s
intentions without committing it to a particular proposal, and stories
about negotiations between two countries apprise other governments of
developments.380 Media reports can even substitute for formal talks when
parties are deadlocked and no longer meeting, and news can send messages
between governments that have no formal diplomatic relations.381
During crises, governments send messages through an array of formal
and informal channels to prevent misunderstandings that can produce
catastrophic consequences.382 While negotiating with the Soviet Union
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy was acutely aware

377. Delmer D. Dunn, Symbiosis: Congress and the Press, in CONGRESS AND THE
NEWS MEDIA 240, 242-43 (Robert O. Blanchard ed., 1974).
378. See Dahlan, supra note 1, at 99-109.
379. For the most thorough discussion of leaks as international communication, see
id. at 94-128.
380. Id. During the Nixon and Ford administrations, Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger frequently leaked information as a “senior State Department official”:
Everybody really knew that I was the senior official. The advantage of doing
it in this manner was that it enabled foreign governments not to have to take a
formal position about what I had said, and not to force me to take a formal
position. Since everybody in the negotiations was, theoretically, pledged to
secrecy, but at the same time, since everybody was giving a briefing on their
own version, I felt it was important that the American version also be
available, so we all played this complicated game.
JEFF BLYSKAL & MARIE BLYSKAL, PR: HOW THE PUBLIC RELATIONS INDUSTRY WRITES
THE NEWS 61-62 (1985); see also, e.g., DORIS GRABER, MASS MEDIA AND AMERICAN
POLITICS 266-71 (7th ed. 2006); R. A. R. Maclennan, Secrecy and the Right of
Parliament to Know and Participate in Foreign Affairs, in SECRECY AND FOREIGN
POLICY 132, 141 (Thomas M. Franck & Edward Weisband eds., 1974) (noting that
European Union nations leak information to communicate with each other).
381. See Dahlan, supra note 1, at 106-28.
382. During the 1956 Middle East crisis, when little news was conveyed formally
through White House and State Department press conferences, cloaked news filled the
gap. CATER, supra note 296, at 130. “During the most critical period in recent months,
at a time when any word out of Washington was considered of international significance,
what had developed, it appeared, was government by leak,” an unidentified
newspaperman remarked. Id.
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that a garbled message could trigger a nuclear exchange.383 He supplemented
the direct, formal contacts between Washington and Moscow with
indirect communications through the press, including some leaked
information.384 But this episode also illustrated the dangers posed by
leaks as intergovernmental communication. The Soviet Union misread a
prominent American newspaper columnist’s suggestion for a diplomatic
solution as a leak authorized and subscribed to by the administration.385
V. ENHANCED PROTECTIONS FOR LEAKS IN CONFIDENTIALITY LAW
News leaks have figured in the nation’s governance since the early
days of the Republic. Yet the law of journalists’ confidentiality
developed before and after Branzburg without sufficiently recognizing
leaks as a form of politics, policymaking, and intra or intergovernment
communication. Confidentiality law must be recalibrated to protect the
indispensable role that certain types of leaks play in modern
governance.386
A. Legal Rationales for Protecting Leaks
At bottom, most leaks are a form of political speech. They express
partisan disagreements, support or oppose policies, relay intelligence
383. See GRAHAM T. ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION:
EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 214-30 (2d ed. 1971); PIERRE SALINGER, WITH
KENNEDY 285-302 (1966).
384. See ALLISON & ZELIKOW, supra note 383, at 214. Kennedy had similarly used
leaks to convey his intentions to the Soviet Union in 1961 over U.S. resolve to remain in
Berlin. See JAMES RESTON, DEADLINE: A MEMOIR 469-70 (1991). Kennedy “did not
want to make the crisis worse by making a personal declaration to this effect. It would,
however, be ‘helpful,’ he said mildly, if I wrote in the Times on my own authority that
this was his clear intention.” Id.
385. Walter Lippmann wrote a column suggesting that the United States should
withdraw its missiles from Turkey if the Soviet Union would do likewise in Cuba.
Lippmann’s intimate connections with the Kennedy administration were well known to
the Kremlin, and Moscow interpreted this proposal as an authentic offer tendered by the
White House. Although Lippmann’s column had often carried administration leaks in
the past, this time the ideas were his own, and the Kremlin’s misinterpretation created
some consternation. See MONTAGUE KERN, PATRICIA W. LEVERING & RALPH B.
LEVERING, THE KENNEDY CRISES: THE PRESS, THE PRESIDENCY, AND FOREIGN POLICY
129-30 (1983); see also WISE, supra note 314, at 78-80 (discussing how President
Johnson mistakenly blamed Robert Kennedy for a foreign affairs leak).
386. The proposal presented here addresses only aspects of journalists’ confidentiality
pertaining to leaks from government sources. It does not tackle many other legal issues
that arise in connection with journalists’ confidentiality.
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within and among governments, and assure a robust flow of information
to the public. The CIA leak case, for instance, began as a dispute over a
single sentence in the 2003 State of the Union Address.387 The political
controversy then mushroomed into a years-long probe that threatened
several journalists with contempt and jailed one before prompting yet
another round of proceedings seeking reporters’ confidential information,
this time for use by a criminal defendant.388
Such intrusion by law into the realm of political communication
deviates from the tradition of according speech about government the
greatest possible latitude. In Free Speech and Its Relation to SelfGovernment, political philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn forcefully
argues that the First Amendment fully protects speech about public
affairs.389 The Supreme Court has reinforced Meiklejohn’s precepts
through the preferred-freedom theory of the First Amendment by making
it extremely difficult for the government to impose certain restraints on
the press.390 Notably, the Court has made it nearly impossible to impose
prior restraints on the press,391 for judges to gag reporters who obtain
information in open court,392 and for public officials to prevail in libel
suits.393 These and other Court rulings, along with much soaring judicial
prose, attest to the special place that speech about government occupies
in the American system of free expression.394
Key attributes and functions of leaks already enjoy some legal
recognition. Courts acknowledge the value of anonymous speech,
387. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
388. Appointed in December 2003, Special Counsel Fitzgerald won an indictment
of Libby in October 2005. See Johnston & Stevenson, supra note 265. In early 2006,
Libby’s defense attorneys indicated that they planned to subpoena the journalists
questioned by Fitzgerald. See Carol D. Leonnig, Libby Team to Subpoena Media,
WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2006, at A7.
389. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948); see also Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an
Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245 (presenting his view that speech about governance
should be absolutely protected).
390. The Court launched the preferred position (or freedom) theory in United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). It suggested that restrictions on
freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights should be subject to “more exacting judicial
scrutiny” than restrictions on other interests. Id. at 152-53 n.4; see also GILLMOR ET AL.,
supra note 188, at 22-23.
391. New York Times v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1935).
392. Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
393. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
394. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“Whatever differences
may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal
agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs.”); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the
libertarian tradition that defines press freedom in relation to government).
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especially in connection with discussions of public affairs;395 leaks
obviously require anonymity. Law enforcers often invoke a privilege to
shield the identity of their informants;396 leaks similarly allow informants in
government to communicate with other officials or the public. Government
speech has a legitimate role in democracies;397 many leaks, notably
authorized messages, constitute speech on behalf of a government agency
or a policy position. In a similar vein, but with different implications,
case law and whistleblower statutes afford government employees’
speech some protection;398 the most valuable leaks function the same
way as employee speech by disclosing wrongdoing or disagreements
within agencies. Finally, courts strenuously resist calls to referee speech

395. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). Talley relied heavily on a historical
review of the importance of anonymous political communication. Id. at 62 & n.3, 64-65;
see also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (protecting the confidentiality of
membership lists so as not to chill freedom of association).
396. See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 306 (1967); Roviaro v. United
States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961). But
cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 697-98 (1972) (distinguishing the informant’s
privilege from a journalist’s privilege).
397. “Participation by the government in the system of freedom of expression is an
essential feature of any democratic society. It enables the government to inform,
explain, and persuade—measures especially crucial in a society that attempts to govern
itself with a minimum use of force.” THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 698 (1970); see also, e.g., 2 CHAFEE, supra note 18, at 723-82; Frederick
Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 373 (1983) (book
review). Some analysts, however, fear that government speech might dominate the
marketplace of ideas and that any protections for such speech can not be found in the
First Amendment’s negative admonition. See MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT
SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983); Randall P.
Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV.
1377, 1502 (2001).
398. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Connick refined
a balancing test first presented in Pickering to protect a public employee’s speech when
it dealt with matters of public concern, which “must be determined by the content, form,
and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.” Connick, 461 U.S. at
147-48. Garcetti refined the test further, indicating that public employees’ statements
made in the course of their work deserve less First Amendment protection than similar
remarks they may offer as citizens. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960. One dissenter
suggested, ironically, that the majority holding offered more cover for public employees
to complain to the press than to their supervisors, which, if true, provides an incentive to
leak. Id. at 1965 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting). Similarly, some lower courts have held that
blowing the whistle through the press partly satisfies the public concern criterion of
Connick and Pickering. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 1, at 372-73. Federal and
state statutes protecting whistleblowers are summarized and discussed in MARCIA P.
MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE 232-79 (1992).
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about politics, such as candidates’ charges and counter-charges at
election time;399 leaks often stem from similar partisan bickering.
Treating leaks as political or governmental speech rather than as an
element of newsgathering would also enhance their constitutional
standing. Although Branzburg acknowledges that newsgathering is not
without First Amendment protections, the Court has been loath to
expressly recognize a constitutionally based public right to know except
in cases involving access to trials.400 To be sure, federal statutes such as
the Freedom of Information Act create limited rights of access,401 and
dicta in First Amendment cases are replete with references to the
importance of an informed citizenry.402 But Justice Stewart, whose
dissent in Branzburg evinced considerable sympathy for the press,
nonetheless warned about relying too heavily on the people’s right to
know as an asserted First Amendment right: “There is no constitutional
right to have access to particular government information, or to require
openness from the bureaucracy. . . . The Constitution itself is neither a
Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act.”403 For governance,
leaks occupy the territory between a Freedom of Information Act and
Official Secrets Act; they spring from “the tug and pull of the political
forces in American society” that ultimately regulate press access to
government information.404
399. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223
(1989) (recognizing that the First Amendment prevents regulation of the content of
campaign speech); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (granting broad
protection to outrageous political and social commentary).
400. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (“This Court has never
intimated a First Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all sources of information
within government control.”). Two years later, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), the Court recognized the right of the public and press to
attend criminal trials, one specific component of gathering news. Chief Justice Warren
Burger wrote the Court’s opinion in both cases.
401. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
402. Advocates of a constitutionally based people’s right to know invariably cite
James Madison: “A popular government, without popular information, or the means of
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or Tragedy; or, perhaps both.” Letter from
James Madison to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). For the argument that a right of access to government
information can be inferred from constitutional jurisprudence, see Thomas I. Emerson,
Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 14. But cf. Thomas I.
Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795, 831 (1981)
(conceding that the right of access suggested by Richmond Newspapers might be quite
limited).
403. Stewart, supra note 17, at 636. For other analyses that caution against pushing
arguments about the public’s right to know too far, see David M. O’BRIEN, THE PUBLIC’S
RIGHT TO KNOW: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 166 (1981); James C.
Goodale, Legal Pitfalls in the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 29.
404. Stewart, supra note 17, at 636 (“The public’s interest in knowing about its
government is protected by the guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is indirect.”).
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B. A Proposal to Protect Leaks
To safeguard the special role of leaks, disputes about the identity of
government sources should be distinguished from routine journalists’
confidentiality claims. Reclassifying leaks as a form of political
communication enhances their constitutional status by establishing
presumptions against identifying sources associated with a preferredfreedom balancing test. Reviewing the widely varied nature of leaks, as
sketched in Part IV, would allow courts to tailor their decisions to
protect anonymity where it advances the most vital forms of political
communication. Congress might also use this approach as it considers
enacting a shield law. States could do likewise as they rework existing
statutory protections.
The first step in securing protection for leaks is to revisit Wigmore’s
criteria for conferring evidentiary privileges:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed;
This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties;
The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered; and
The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for
the correct disposal of litigation.405

Pre-Branzburg court decisions and commentators proceeded with the
largely unexamined premise that journalists’ confidentiality claims did
not satisfy Wigmore’s criteria, and they certainly never considered leaks
as a distinct category.406 Thus, the body of decisions that culminated in

405. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at 1-2 (2d ed. 1923).
406. Wigmore did not disguise his hostility to an evidentiary privilege for
journalists. He referred to the Maryland shield law “as detestable in substance as it is
crude in form” and inaccurately predicted in 1923 that it “will probably remain unique.”
Id. § 2286, at 4 n.7. Wigmore’s criteria for granting evidentiary privileges did not
change between the 1923 edition of his treatise and the Court’s reliance on his work in
Branzburg. See 408 U.S. 665, 691 n.29 (1972); compare 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285,
at 1-2 (2d ed. 1923), with 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at 527 (McNaughton rev.
1961) (indicating only changes in punctuation). But see James A. Guest & Alan L.
Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 NW.
U. L. REV. 18, 26-27 (1969) (arguing shortly before Branzburg that “a literal application
of Wigmore’s conditions to the issue of the newsman’s privilege borders on sophistry
and drastically misconstrues the problem”).
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Banzburg failed to seriously apply Wigmore’s test.407 Now the issue
should be judged anew, particularly for leaks.
Leaks satisfy Wigmore’s first confidentiality requirement by definition.
As for the second criterion regarding the essential nature of the secrecy,
officials admittedly have considerable self-interest in maintaining
relations with the press even without expectations of confidentiality.
But the leaks that contribute most to governance—those involving
whistleblowing and policy disputes—are also the ones most dependent
on concealing a source’s identity.
Wigmore’s third and fourth criteria require an assessment of leaks’
value to society. Leaks have enhanced political communication for two
hundred years despite fundamental change in the nation’s press, politics,
and government. They have functioned as a necessary part of governance,
which addresses Wigmore’s third requirement. The fourth criterion invites
judges or legislatures to balance the value of leaks against evidentiary
needs in different contexts. Judge Tatel’s concurrence in the CIA leak case
took a first step in that direction.408 In at least one vital respect pertinent
to Wigmore’s third and fourth criteria, reporters’ confidentiality surpasses
the societal value of traditional evidentiary privileges (lawyer-client,
doctor-patient, and clergy-penitent). Journalists shield their government
sources to provide the public, and indirectly the legal system, with more
information about public affairs. In stark contrast, lawyers, doctors,
clergy, and others invoke long recognized privileges to assure that less
information becomes public.409
Consequently, confidentiality law, at least as it applies to leaks from
government sources, should be reconceived along the following lines.
The party seeking disclosure of a reporter’s government sources should
first prove relevancy and exhaustion of alternative sources, requirements
already widely accepted and often easily satisfied. The outcome in most
leak cases will thus turn on balancing the benefits of preserving
confidentiality against the importance of the source’s identity in a legal
action. This is essentially the “compelling need” test from Stewart’s
Branzburg dissent as recognized in many shield laws and court
decisions. In striking this balance, courts should treat most leaks from
government sources as a form of political speech with its attendant
protections. Starting with a presumption against disclosure, the party
407. In pressing for a federal shield law in the wake of Branzburg, Representative
Charles W. Whalen, Jr., a Republican of Ohio, argued that journalists’ claim for an
evidentiary privilege satisfied Wigmore’s requirements. See 1973 House Hearings, supra
note 174, at 177-78; CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR., YOUR RIGHT TO KNOW 147-54 (1973).
408. See supra text accompanying notes 288-94.
409. See Fred S. Siebert, Professional Secrecy and the Journalist, 36 JOURNALISM
Q. 3, 6-8 (1959).
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seeking a source’s identity would have a burden to prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the need for the testimony outweighed the
value of protecting this form of political communication. The balancing
should consider the merits of political communication in the case at hand
as well as its implications for chilling similar speech in the future. For
instance, forcing disclosure of a whistleblower’s identity in one case
might discourage others from stepping forward.
Judgments about the contributions of a leak to governance, and hence
the variable weight accorded to it in a balancing test, should be informed
by an analysis along the lines of the one presented in Part IV. At one
end of the continuum are leaks that perform an indispensable role in
political speech. Whistleblowing and anonymous communications from
sources inside agencies registering disagreements with policies fit here
because the formal channels of government often bottle up such
messages.410 These leaks honor the long tradition of the press serving as
a check on government. Furthermore, such leaks counterbalance all the
tools government uses to communicate, or spin, official policy.
Less but still considerable weight should be accorded leaks that
communicate information from one agency to another or signal the
positions of key players.411 Through such leaks, the press facilitates
government decisionmaking. Leaks from ongoing investigations conducted
by grand juries, the police, the FBI, and the like also fall in the middle
range. If obtaining inside information is merely a scoop for a media
outlet, prematurely publicizing information that would ultimately
come out anyway, then a leak deserves little weight in balancing
against the need to reveal the source.412 However, where leaks stimulate
an investigation and keep it on track, as in Watergate, then protecting
confidentiality warrants much greater deference.413 At the opposite end
of the spectrum, deserving little weight for their negligible contributions
to governance, are leaks advancing personal goals. These leaks use
anonymous messages to burnish or attack reputations.414 When courts
address government leak cases as a distinct subset of journalists’
confidentiality claims, they can further refine the variable weight to accord
different types of anonymous messages conveyed through the press.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

See supra notes 316-20, 358-62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 371-77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 234-39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 11, 361-62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 325-35 and accompanying text.
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Journalists, First Amendment stalwarts, and even judges might recoil
at the prospect of having courts pass judgment on good versus bad leaks
and probe the motives of sources and journalists.415 But courts already
have experience conducting inquiries into the journalistic and political
contexts of news stories. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
an important forum for leak cases, devised a test that relied extensively
on judgments about the context of a story to determine whether allegedly
defamatory statements should be treated as opinion or factual assertions.416
Other questions of libel and privacy law417 similarly require courts to delve
into the context of a news story. Weighing the political context of a leak
thus represents nothing new for courts. Stories themselves often provide
cues that can assist in categorizing a leak.418 And courts can evaluate a
reporter’s source information in camera to gain a better sense of whether
protecting the identity outweighs the need for disclosure.419
Focusing on the role of leaks in governance also obviates difficult
decisions about who qualifies as a professional communicator entitled to
a testimonial privilege. Branzburg expressed serious reservations about
recognizing “a constitutional newsman’s privilege”:
Sooner or later, it would be necessary to define those categories of newsmen
who qualified for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the
traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer
who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large
metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition methods.420

415. See SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION
218 (1983) (arguing from a philosophical and ethical vantage point that it is appropriate
to distinguish between good and bad leaks).
416. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc). The Ollman
test requires determining (1) whether the allegedly defamatory statement is susceptible to
being proved true or false; (2) the ordinary meaning of the words; (3) the journalistic
context of the remarks; and (4) the social context of the language at issue. Id. at 979-84;
see also Timothy W. Gleason, The Fact/Opinion Distinction in Libel, 10 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 763 (1988).
417. In libel law, for example, deciding whether a plaintiff is a limited-purpose
public figure (having to prove actual malice) or a private person (having to prove only
negligence), depends on assessing the nature of the underlying controversy, the
plaintiff’s role in it, and the timing of the plaintiff’s involvement in relation to the
publication of the defamatory message. See DON PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 175-84 (2005).
For the tort of publicizing embarrassing private facts, courts or juries must consider
whether the intimate information is of legitimate public concern or newsworthy. See,
e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975); PEMBER, supra note 417, at 288-93.
418. A helpful analysis of contextual considerations to be used in evaluating
confidentiality claims can be found in Levi, supra note 104, at 714-27.
419. On in camera review in journalists’ confidentiality cases, see DIENES, LEVINE
& LIND, supra note 3, at 1022-24.
420. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703-04 (1972); see also Clay Calvert, And
You Call Yourself a Journalist?: Wrestling with a Definition of “Journalist” in the Law,
103 DICK. L. REV. 411 (1999); Kraig L. Baker, Note, Are Oliver Stone and Tom Clancy
Journalists? Determining Who Has Standing to Claim the Journalist’s Privilege, 69
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Indeed, state shield laws do vary considerably in the range of communicators
brought within their protective ambit, which “only serves to heighten the
concern expressed by the majority in Branzburg.”421 Today, of course,
almost anyone can become a communicator simply by creating a Web
site or a blog. One judge in the CIA leak case speculated that government
leakers could avoid detection by channeling their messages through a
friendly blogger who would then claim an evidentiary privilege as a
journalist.422 As a practical matter, leaking to the New York Times,
Washington Post, and other established media remains the preferred route
for most government sources.423 But if leaks start springing from more
ephemeral media, legal judgments about journalists’ confidentiality
should turn on the nature of the leak—specifically its place in
governance—rather than the nature of the communicator conveying it.
The threshold for forced disclosure of journalists’ government sources
should also vary with the legal setting in which a leaker’s identity is
sought. Courts and legislatures could reasonably set a higher bar for
disclosure in the investigative phase of an inquiry than in adjudicating
outcomes,424 a distinction recognized for government informants.425
WASH. L. REV. 739 (1994). Frederick Schauer, however, believes that First Amendment
jurisprudence could make constitutionally defensible and socially beneficial distinctions
among communication institutions and their personnel. See Schauer’s articles cited
supra note 21.
421. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 980-81 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (Sentelle, J., concurring) (sketching the range of communicators covered by state
shield laws); Anthony L. Fargo, Analyzing Federal Shield Law Proposals: What
Congress Can Learn from the States, 11 COMM L. & POL’Y 35, 50-51, 56-59 (2006).
422. Miller, 397 F.3d at 979-80 (“[W]ould it not be possible for a government
official wishing to engage in the sort of unlawful leaking under investigation in the
present controversy to call a trusted friend or a political ally, advise him to set up a Web
log (which I understand takes about three minutes) and then leak to him under a promise
of confidentiality the information which the law forbids the official to disclose?”). This
scenario parallels one suggested in Branzburg long before the Internet: groups establishing
“‘sham’ newspapers” to shield their criminal activities by invoking a journalist’s privilege.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 705 n.40. Such subterfuges to cloak leaks by manufacturing a
reporter-source relationship seem farfetched.
423. Even in the age of the Internet, government leakers prefer established media as
outlets. The established media directly reach Washington decisionmakers, involve
journalists with whom sources have already cultivated relationships and, if litigation
ensues, reporters for such media can draw on their employers’ considerable legal and
financial resources to shield the source.
424. In the wake of Branzburg, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws considered a model shield law that would have protected journalists
from compelled testimony in investigative proceedings but required testimony in some
trials. See 1973 House Hearings, supra note 174, at 131-33 (testimony of Professor
Vincent Blasi presenting the draft shield law); David Shipler, Model Newsmen’s
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Ironically, Branzburg’s grip on confidentiality law has produced the
opposite effect. Lower courts hesitate to deny grand jury requests for
compelled testimony because the Supreme Court ruling dealt expressly
with that situation.426 By their nature, however, investigative proceedings
such as grand jury probes and legislative hearings cast a wide net,
operate with fewer checks than trials, and serve as but a preliminary step
for later action if warranted.427 Subpoenas issued to journalists in the
course of investigative and adjudicative proceedings thus “are vastly
different, both in terms of their evidentiary gain and also in terms of the
damage they do, the fears they generate, [and] the climate they create
which is the real problem.”428 Fifteen years before Branzburg, the
Supreme Court also recognized the dangers of compelled testimony in
investigations. “It is particularly important that the exercise of the power of
compulsory process be carefully circumscribed when the investigative
process tends to impinge upon such highly sensitive areas as freedom of
speech or press, freedom of political association, and freedom of
communication of ideas.”429
For trials, in contrast, a lower threshold for compelled disclosure of a
source’s identity might adequately protect the contributions of leaks to
governance because such adjudications proceed with a tighter focus and
more rigorous safeguards. Criminal defendants clearly have a strong
constitutional claim to compel exculpatory testimony and prosecutors
should be entitled to nearly the same consideration for trials. For civil
proceedings, judges need to safeguard political communication by
limiting discovery when it intrudes into confidential relations between
government sources and the press.430 Libel suits, however, warrant a
Privilege Law Being Drafted, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1973, at 32. Some of the federal
shield bills considered by Congress in the mid-1970s also provided absolute protection
for journalists appearing before grand juries but less protection for trials, an approach
that won grudging support from prominent news organizations. See VAN GERPEN, supra
note 148, at 169. It should be noted that these proposals did not distinguish between
leaks and other types of journalists’ confidentiality claims, as does this Article.
425. Compare United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) (protecting the identity
of an informant for investigatory purposes, specifically for securing a search warrant),
with Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (holding that an informant’s identity
should be disclosed at trial when central to the defense).
426. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
427. But see Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 687-88 (explaining the reasons for according
grand juries such wide latitude).
428. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 174, at 129 (remarks of Professor Vince
Blasi); see also Reporters and Their Sources, supra note 149, at 345-58 (offering an
extended argument for protecting journalists’ confidentiality in grand jury and legislative
investigations).
429. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 245 (1957).
430. See Reporters and Their Sources, supra note 149, at 358-60 (arguing for an
absolute journalists’ privilege in civil litigation except for libel suits, though without
distinguishing between government and other sources).
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lower threshold for disclosure. When the plaintiff has established falsity
and clearly needs a government source’s identity to prove fault, either
actual malice or negligence, a media defendant should not be able to
shield the source to avoid liability.
Finally, the contribution of leaks to political communication entitles
them to special consideration when a government agency seeks to unveil
a source’s identity. To do otherwise invites officials, who enjoy considerable
discretion in these matters, to pursue leaks they dislike even as they
sponsor their own leaks, as has nearly every administration since World
War II.431 This raises the specter of content or viewpoint discrimination

431. All administrations since World War II have conducted investigations to find
the sources of unwelcome leaks, usually unsuccessfully. On leak investigations during
the 1950s and 1960s, see ROURKE, supra note 329, at 78-80; SIGAL, supra note 296, at
145-47; WISE, supra note 314, at 284-86; Dahlan, supra note 1, at 70-71. On
investigations during the Ford administration, see JOSEPH C. SPEAR, PRESIDENTS AND THE
PRESS 284-85 (1984). On investigations during the Carter administration, see id. at 28788. On investigations during the Reagan administration, including efforts to restrict
officials’ contacts with the press and give suspected informants polygraph tests, see
A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LAW & NAT’L SECURITY, THE MEDIA AND GOVERNMENT
LEAKS passim (Patricia Garvin Cathcart & Deborah Fletcher eds., 1984); LAURENCE I.
BARRETT, GAMBLING WITH HISTORY: RONALD REAGAN IN THE WHITE HOUSE 429-36
(1983); HERTSGAARD, supra note 298, at 140-47; HESS, supra note 1, at 86-92; SPEAR,
supra, at 29-31, 292. On investigations during the George H. W. Bush administration,
see Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Would Oust Rio Memo’s Leaker, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1992,
at A5. On investigations during the Clinton administration, see Debra G. Hernandez,
Investigating Leaks, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Apr. 13, 1996, at 14. See also GROSSMAN &
KUMAR, supra note 306, at 280 (quoting officials on difficulties in tracking down
leakers); HESS, supra note 1, at 88 (citing a General Accounting Office study that
between 1975 and 1982 the Department of Defense investigated sixty-eight leaks); Alan
M. Katz, Government Information Leaks and the First Amendment, 64 CAL. L. REV. 108
(1976) (analyzing criminal and civil actions against leakers in the 1960s and 1970s).
Congress has also conducted a number of leak investigations. One that is especially
revealing suggests that while Congress publicly deplores leaks from its ranks, it actually
prefers not to inquire too deeply. In 1991, the Senate appointed a temporary special
independent counsel to investigate leaks from the Senate confirmation hearings for
Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas and leaks from the Ethics Committee about
five Senators suspected of improper dealings with the head of a savings and loan
company. The special counsel carefully documented the leaks in the two cases and
railed against the congressional culture of leaking, but could not identify any leakers.
See S. DOC. NO. 102-20, pt. 1 (1992). The special counsel complained that “[t]he
journalists possessed the evidence which was most relevant to fulfilling the mandate of”
the investigation, id. at 78, but the Senate declined to grant authority to compel their
testimony. See S. DOC. NO. 102-20, pt. 2, at 22-24 (1992). The special counsel
concluded that Congress did not truly want to jeopardize “the continued ability and
perhaps even the right of senators and staff persons to disclose confidential information
with a certainty that their anonymity will be secure.” S. DOC. NO. 102-20, pt. 1, at 80.
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for political speech.432 Because unauthorized leaks augment and even
challenge messages dispensed through official channels, they function as
“[i]mportant safety valves in the U.S. government.”433 They deserve
deference, and a higher burden of proof to compel disclosure, for
journalists in confidentiality cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Outwardly, government and the press have changed dramatically since
the 1795 leak of the Jay Treaty. Yet leaks function in much the same
fashion today: they facilitate government decisionmaking while
augmenting information available to the public. As the locus of federal
policymaking during the nineteenth century, Congress was initially the
source of most leaks and launched occasional investigations to discover
journalists’ informants. By the end of the century, however, most members
of Congress accepted leaks as an element of governance and thereafter
rarely demanded that journalists disclose their sources. The rise of the
administrative state, including the ascendancy of the White House,
provided another impetus for leaking to the press to communicate within
and across the sprawling, ever more complex federal establishment.
Thus, by the mid-twentieth century, leaks had become a common tool of
governance, even during such crises as World War II and the Cold War.
Viewed historically and functionally, anonymous communications
from government sources to the press can be distinguished from other
situations that present legal questions about journalists’ confidentiality.
The media’s traditional claim for shielding their sources—to assure an
unfettered flow of information to the public—undervalues the significance
of leaks and rests on shaky constitutional underpinnings. Treating leaks
as messages by and about government entitles them to consideration as
political speech and honors their institutional role in a democratic
society. Not all leaks deserve equal treatment under this reformulation
and, in rare circumstances, some should still be subject to disclosure.
But moving toward a more nuanced understanding of leaks’ varied nature
and contributions to governance would assist judges and legislators in
properly adjusting the interests at stake. It would also give government
sources and their media contacts greater predictability about the legal
consequences, and ethical merits, of crafting stories based on leaks.
432. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (invalidating a hate speech
ordinance because it punished specified viewpoints); see also KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN &
GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 193 (1999) (“The Court generally treats
restriction of the expression of a particular point of view as the paradigm violation of the
First Amendment.”).
433. HECLO, supra note 316, at 231.
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